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Abstract
Chapter 1 examines geographic variations in physician practice styles by exploring
the role of physician-specific factors such as preferences and learned behavior versus
environment-level factors such as hospital capacity. I exploit cardiologist migration
across geographic regions and find that physicians who start off in the same region
and subsequently move to dissimilar regions practice similarly before the move but
very differently after the move. Based on this change in behavior, baseline estimates
imply that the role of the environment on physician behavior is twice as important as
physician-specific factors. Specifically, a one percentage point change in practice envi-
ronment results in an immediate 2/3 percentage point change in physician behavior,
with no further changes over time.
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Leila Agha) explores the diffusion of new cancer
drugs by testing the influence of physician investigators who lead clinical trials. The
basic idea is to exploit variation across drugs in the location of clinical trials to
test whether geographic proximity to a principal investigator influences the speed of
technology adoption. Using original data on clinical trial study authors and sites for
21 new cancer drugs along with Medicare claims data from 1998-2008, we estimate
that patients are 30% more likely to receive treatment with a new drug if they seek
care in the hospital referral region where the drug's principal investigator practices.
This effect, which is estimated in the first two years following initial FDA approval,
fades over time until there is no apparent difference in utilization after four years.
Chapter 3 (co-authored with Leila Agha) explores the prescribing of new cancer
drugs for off-label (non-FDA approved) indications, yielding three key results. First,
over 20% of new cancer drug use within the Medicare population over 1998-2008 was
applied to off-label cancers. Second, geographic proximity to the principal investigator
of a drug's pivotal clinical trial-a factor which appears to significantly boost on-
label usage-has no discernible impact on off-label prescribing. Third, we find that
prescribing increases following FDA approval expansions, suggesting that approval
status influences patient treatment and thus may provide a useful policy instrument
for directing medical technology adoption.
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Chapter 1
The Evolution of Physician
Practice Styles: Evidence from
Cardiologist Migration
1.1 Introduction
Health spending per capita varies dramatically across U.S. regions. For example, age-,
race-, and sex-adjusted spending in Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program in
2008 was $16,050 per enrollee in the Miami, FL region compared with $7,352 in the
Minneapolis, MN region (Skinner. Gottlie, and Carmihael, 2011). Tfhese spending
disparities arise primarily from regional differences in the types and quantities of ser-
vices patients receive (Skinner aindr Fisher, 1997; (Gotitlieb et al., 2010). Spawned by
WmNNiberg and Gittelsohnu's (1973) classic study finding ten-fold differences in tonsil-
lectomy rates across Vermont towns, an enormous literature has consistently docu-
mented widespread variability in cross-regional rates of hundreds of medical interven-
*1 am very grateful to my advisors Amitabh Chandra, Amy Finkelstein, and Jonathan Gruber,
for their guidance and support. I also thank David Chan, Joseph Doyle, Iuliana Pascu, Michael
Powell, and especially Heidi Williams for detailed feedback, as well as seminar participants at MIT
for helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the National Institute on
Aging, grant number T32-AG000186.
'Large regional disparities have also been documented in Medicaid, the centrally bud-
geted Veterans Affairs health care system, and the private sector (Mlartin et al., 2007;
Cnmgressional Budget Office, 2008; Philison et al., 2010).
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tions within a variety of patient populations and institutional contexts (Phe1ps, 1992,
provides a review). 2
Despite extensive research documenting regional variations in health care delivery,
relatively little is known about their causes. Direct adjustments to reflect apparent
differences in average levels of patient illness, socioeconomic status, or preferences
typically resolve little of the variations (niiato et al., 2007; Zuckermn et al, 2010).
Moreover, and strikingly, a variety of evidence suggests that the quality of care and
health outcomes in high-use regions are little better or even worse than in low-use
regions (Fisher et al , 2003;ib0; B-aicker and (Ihadi(ra, 2001; Sirovich et al., 2006). A
common interpretation of this fact is that additional health spending yields little or no
health benefit, implying that reducing variations by moving high-use regions to behave
like low-use regions could lower overall spending by 30 percent without sacrificing
quality of care (\\Ciuibewrg. Fisher. and Skinner, 2002). But in order to address how
to change patterns of care-or to assess whether changes are even desirable-a key
ingredient is understanding what drives these regional variations. Because patterns of
care ultimately arise from the accumulation of decisions individual physicians make
about which procedures to prescribe their patients, the more fundamental question
is what drives physician treatment decisions.
This paper explores the role of the physician versus his practice environment in
explaining regional differences in how physicians treat similar patients. Environment-
specific factors such as financial and legal incentives, hospital capacity, and pro-
ductivity spillovers extend influence across local groups of physicians, and therefore
may drive practice style differences across practice settings. On the other hand,
physician-specific factors such as preferences, training, and experience may cause
physicians to treat patients differently even under similar environments. Consistent
with this possibility, physicians practicing in the same local health care market often
exhibit large and persistent "style" differences in their tendency to prescribe certain
treatments and utilize medical resources (Phelps 2000; Grytten adit Sdeese, 2003;
2The study of medical practice variations began with G'wer (1938), who analyzed regional ton-
sillectomy rates of British school children.
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Epstein an(,d Nicholson, 2009). These styles exist even when physicians have access
to the same hospital facilities and ancillary staff and when the patients are random-
ized to physician teams (Doyle., Ewer. and Vagner, 2010). If physicians agglomerate
geographically based on individual-level factors that drive practice styles (e.g. physi-
cians practicing close to where they were trained, or physicians in the same region
accumulating similar experiences), physician-specific factors could drive practice style
differences across regions.
At least two conceptual issues have hampered empirical investigations attempting
to separate effects of the environment from those specific to the physician. The first
is that physician factors such as training and experience may form endogenously in
response to the physician's environment. This issue can be at least partially resolved
by looking at factors such as residency training that pre-date the current environ-
ment (Dranove.. Ramnaayanan, and Sfekas, 2011). However, even when historical
physician information is available, a second and potentially more substantial identifi-
cation issue is that physicians may choose a practice setting based on their individual
practice style or otherwise correlated with physician-specific determinants of prac-
tice style. Failure to account for such "positive matching" may yield estimates that
overstate the effect of the environment on physician behavior.
The primary contribution of this paper is to exploit an empirical context pro-
viding variation in a physician's environment while also allowing explicit controls for
physician selection. Using 17 years of Medicare patient claims, I construct histories of
treatment decisions for individual physicians and identify a set of physicians who move
across geographic regions during this period. I then trace out how migrant behavior
changes over time with respect to the move as a function of the change in environ-
ment experienced across the move. Selective migration is identified by the extent to
which physicians who move to higher or lower intensity regions have differential levels
or trends in pre-move behavior relative to their peers. The full environment effect
is identified by the change in physician behavior across the move as well as by the
subsequent time-pattern of behavior relative to the move date.
Using this approach, I begin by testing two polar scenarios. First, I test whether
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physician practice styles are fully ingrained once physicians have completed medi-
cal training and taken up clinical practice. If this is the case, then changes in a
physician's practice environment should not affect how the physician treats similar
patients. Second, I test the other extreme of whether physicians completely conform
to changes in their environment regardless of their training or past experiences. Full
convergence would point to steady-state differences in regional practice styles arising
from differences in the contemporaneous influences under which physicians operate. If
physicians do not completely conform to environment changes, however, then physi-
cian behavior is persistent and small changes in their early training or experience
could have long-run effects. Finally, an additional advantage of the empirical ap-
proach I employ is that it will not only allow me to test whether either of these polar
scenarios holds true but will also provide an estimate for where reality lies between
the two.
The specific context of my study is cardiologists treating heart attack patients. My
data identify 17,935 cardiologists, 2,704 (15.1%) of whom move their practice location
across geographic medical markets during the period 1992-2008. Cardiologists may
choose to treat heart attack patients with an "aggressive" approach marked by early
patient receipt of an invasive procedure called cardiac catheterization, or they may
follow a "conservative" approach using medical management (drugs). Consistent
with previous studies on geographic variations (e.g. G(atsonis (t al., 1995), I find that
the share of heart attack patients receiving aggressive treatment varies considerably
across geographic regions, with a median of 0.37 and an interquartile range of 0.11.
In my key empirical analysis, I find that for cardiologists who move, a change in
a physician's practice environment results in a significant and instantaneous change
in the physician's individual practice style. Specifically, if 0 and D represent the
fraction of patients treated aggressively in a physician's respective origin and destina-
tion practice regions, then the physician's individual propensity to treat aggressively
changes by 2/3(D -0) on average across the move. Moreover, this change in behavior
occurs immediately after a physician's move with no additional changes over time,
suggesting that further learning or adaptation is limited. Finally, I fail to find evi-
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dence of physician selection-cardiologists who move to more-aggressive regions were
no more aggressive than their peers prior to the move. These results reject both po-
lar views discussed above: physicians appear strongly to respond to changes in their
practice environment, but also do not appear to completely conform to these changes.
The estimated change in physician behavior implies that both the environment and
the physician matter, with the role of the environment on physician behavior twice
as large as physician-specific factors.
Next, I explore the nature of physician behavior changes in greater detail in order
to shed light on the mechanisms underlying regional heterogeneity in practice styles.
One predominant theory used to explain the existence and persistence of regional
practice variations is the Phelps and NooneY (1993) "schools of thought" model of
information diffusion in which physician practice styles initially form during train-
ing and evolve over time according to a Bayesian learning process as physicians are
exposed to new environments. In contrast to the implications of this model, I find
that physician behavior responds immediately to changes in their environment with
no further convergence over time, and that physicians who move later in their career
respond more to the environment than those who move early in their career. Another
possibility I explore is whether physicians respond asymmetrically to decreases versus
increases in the intensity of their environment. While the point estimates suggest that
physicians respond more to decreases in environment intensity than to increases, the
estimates are too noisy to reject the null of no asymmetry.
My approach in this paper is closely related to a growing literature that uses migra-
tion patterns to isolate the effects of culture and past experiences from the current en-
vironment on consumer preferences and choices (Ferntndez, 2008, provides a review).
Three studies that, like my empirical methology, exploit panel observations of mi-
grants before and after a move are: using worker movements across branches in a firm
to identify the impact of individual background and group interactions on employee
shirking behavior (Ichino arni M , 2000); using patient migration across geographic
regions to identify regional diagnosis propensities separately from patient characteris-
tics (Song et il., 2010); and tracking tax payers across a move to identify local neigh-
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borhood effects on worker response to the EITC (Chiett, Friedma8 n, (ati Saez, 2011).
My approach is also closely related to the "brand capital" model of
3i )flrnenibr. I )ube, aind (Gentzkow (forthcorning), in which consumer purchase choices
depend not only on contemporaneous supply factors but also on brand exposure in
the past. Analogously in my context, physicians accumulate "technology capital"
that may influence their treatment (i.e. technology) choices holding constant the
practice environment. To the best of my knowledge, the current paper is the first to
exploit physician migration patterns to separately identify the role physician-specific
and environment-level factors play in determining physician practice styles.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the empirical context and key data elements. Sec tion 1.3 lays out the primary em-
pirical strategies and provides results, and section L_4 explores physician behavior
changes in more detail. In section 1.5 I briefly discuss potential mechanisms, and
section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Setting and Data
1.2.1 Context: Heart Attack Treatment
Each year nearly 1 million Americans suffer a heart attack, resulting in more than
130,000 deaths." Heart attacks, referred to clinically as acute myocardial infarction
(AMI), occur when part of the heart's blood supply is blocked, starving the heart
of oxygen and causing muscle cells to die. Heart attacks are an emergency condi-
tion and require immediate hospitalization. While there are a variety of heart attack
treatments, all essentially amount to reducing the heart's demand for oxygen and
increasing blood supply to the muscle. To increase blood supply, doctors may either
use medical management (drugs) or take an invasive approach. In the medical ap-
proach, thrombolytic "clot-busting" drugs are used to dissolve blood clots blocking
coronary arteries and are typically most effective when administered within 3 hours
3Source: CDC http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58-9.pdf. Death count from
2007.
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after the heart attack occurs. The primary invasive techniques to restore blood flow
to the heart are angioplasty (balloon dilation of the blocked artery, with or without
stenting) and open-heart bypass surgery (artery graft to "bypass" the blockage).
To determine whether a patient is a candidate for an invasive procedure, the
doctor must identify the precise location and severity of blockages. This can be
accomplished through a diagnostic technique called angiography. This procedure
is usually included as part of cardiac catheterization (often referred to simply as a
"cath") in which a thin catheter is threaded into the coronary arteries. Contrast die is
injected through the catheter into the blood stream, while x-ray video cameras track
the flow of die to reveal areas where the coronary arteries are severely restricted or
blocked. In this role, cardiac catheterization is commonly used and well-understood
as a marker for invasive heart attack treatment (see e.g. Miclellim imd Newoiise,
1.997; CnIda and Stie, 2007).
The empirical work in this paper focuses on AMI treatment for four reasons. First,
heart attack treatment is characterized by two competing management approaches:
an "early invasive" approach marked by patient catheterization shortly after hospital
admission regardless of the patient's receipt of or response to thrombolytic therapy,
and a conservative "wait-and-see" approach in which patients are first given throm-
bolytic drugs and receive cardiac catheterization only if symptoms persist. Both
approaches have been heavily analyzed and debated in the medical literature (see
e.g. Keeley a1nd( Grintes, 2004; Brophy a(nd Bogaty, 2001; Scailon et al., 1999). Since
early versus delayed cardiac catheterization is typically defined with reference to a 12-
to 48-hour time window (IKushner et al., 2009), I use receipt of catheterization within
2 days of AMI hospital admission as the measure of early invasive management. This
dichotomy allows both regions and physicians to be characterized by the management
style choices (i.e. cath rate) used for their patients. The second reason for studying
heart attacks is the large variation across regions in the rate of invasive management
of heart attack patients. Thus, cardiologists who move their practice across regions
will be exposed to potentially large changes in their practice environment. Third, the
emergency nature of heart attacks generally inhibits patients from traveling long dis-
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tances to seek care. This makes it possible to define geographically distinct markets
for AMI treatment in which physicians practice. Finally, as a result of their emer-
gency nature, heart attacks also provide a setting where the sorting of patient types
to physicians is likely to be limited. This alleviates concerns that patients who are
most appropriate (perhaps in unobservable ways) for a particular type of treatment
will be sorted to cardiologists who specialize in that treatment.
1.2.2 Data Description
The three key data elements needed for the empirical analysis are a cardiologist's in-
dividual cath rate over time, the geographic region in which the cardiologist practices
at each point in time, and the overall cath rate of each practice region.
Cardiologist catheterization rates
A critical element of my analysis is tracking the behavior of individual physicians
both over time and across practice settings. To do this, I exploit the convenient
fact that each physician who treats patients in the Medicare program is given a
Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN) which remains with the physician
throughout his or her career. To identify cardiologists, I link the universe of Medicare
UPINs to the American Medical Association's Physician Masterfile, which includes
current and historical data on virtually all Doctors of Medicine (MD) ever trained or
licensed to practice in the United States. I define cardiologists to be those physicians
in the Medicare program who have completed a 3-year fellowship in cardiovascular
disease. Thus, physicians are identified as cardiologists based on their training, rather
than by self-declared specialty.
To measure the cath rate behavior of these cardiologists over time, I use physi-
cian Medicare reimbursement claims for the 17-year period 1992-2008 to assign AMI
patients who see a cardiologist within two days of hospital admission to the first car-
diologist treating the patient. I restrict to the subset of all Medicare fee-for-service
beneficiaries for whom physician claims are available in my data (5% of patients prior
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to 1998, and 20% thereafter). Claims only identify the day on which the physician
treated the patient. For each patient to match to a unique cardiologist, I limit the
sample to patients (68%) seeing a single cardiologist on the first day. The resulting
sample includes 17,935 cardiologists treating 360,121 patients.
One benefit of identifying a patient with the first treating cardiologist is that it
simplifies comparing behavior across physicians in the same environment by mini-
mizing concerns of selective sorting of patients to cardiologists-a typical emergency
room protocol is to initially assign a confirmed or suspected AMI patient to the car-
diologist on call. Moreover, due to the emergency nature of heart attacks and high
time-sensitivity of the relative benefits of different treatment paths, the initial cardi-
ologist is likely to have an important impact as a "gatekeeper" to subsequent care the
patient receives, whether or not this cardiologist actually performs the services. Fi-
nally, the cardiologist's decision may be one of many in the hospital setting that affect
the treatment of the patient, which is important to keep in mind when interpreting
results.
Cardiologist practice regions and migration
Measuring a cardiologist's practice environment over time first requires defining local
markets for AMI treatment. For this, I use Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) which
were developed by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care and are commonly used as the
regional unit of analysis for heart attack treatment (see e.g. Skimier, Staiger, and Fisher,
2006; Chandra mad St aiger, 2007). HRRs, which by construction contain at least one
hospital performing major cardiovascular procedures, partition U.S. zip code areas
into 306 distinct regions based on where the majority of the population in each zip
code are referred for tertiary health care services. I assign physicians to practice re-
gions (HRRs) based on the zip code of the hospital admitting their patients, while
the admission date specifies the point in time.
Defining practice regions using HRRs is preferrable to using state or city bound-
aries because it relies on geographic boundaries derived empirically from where physi-
cians refer and treat patients. HRRs are also preferrable to finer definitions of practice
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regions such as the hospital for a number of reasons. First, because physicians typi-
cally hold operating privileges and see patients at multiple hospitals within a region
at any point in time, a very limited characterization of the local market complicates
the specification of a physician's current practice environment as well as what consti-
tutes a "move." Further, regional influences outside a physician's own hospital may
also influence a physician's treatment behavior either through professional and social
interactions (such as learning or peer effects) or through the ability to refer patients
to those hospitals for treatment. However, to the extent that HRRs mis-capture the
relevant market environment influencing physicians, this characterization of the prac-
tice environment may lead to an underestimate of the full effect of the environment
on physician behavior. I address this issue in more detail in the empirical analysis.
Given a geography of local practice environments, I next seek to identify the set
of cardiologists who move their practice from one region to another. Because the
majority of cardiologists never move, I attempt to construct a set of movers with
the goal of maximizing sample size while also being relatively clean in what defines
a move. To do this, I mark the first and last date a cardiologist practices in each
HRR, if ever, and refer to these spells as the cardiologist's "practice episodes." For
each cardiologist, I mark the practice episode during which the cardiologist treated
the most patients during the period of my analysis, and label this the cardiologist's
"primary" episode. Similarly, I further define a cardiologist's "secondary" practice
episode to be the largest episode (in terms of patients treated) that does not overlap
the primary episode, if such an episode exists. The cardiologists with both primary
and secondary practice episodes comprise my final sample of movers which contains
2,704 (15.1% of 17,935) unique cardiologists treating a combined 51,636 (14.3% of
360,121) patients within 8 years before or after moving.
Regional catheterization rates
I define the overall cath rate in each region using hospital stay records for the universe
of Medicare fee-for-service population during the period 1992-2008. Heart attack pa-
tients are identified by a principal diagnosis of AMI (ICD-9-CM codes 410.x); for
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patients with multiple primary AMI admissions, only the first record is kept, result-
ing in 4.8 million "fresh" heart attack patients (~282,000/year). Based on procedure
codes reported in the hospital stay records, I determined whether each patient under-
went cardiac catheterization within two days of the primary AMI hospital admission.
Finally, I assign patients to the HRR in which the admitting hospital is located,
allowing me to calculate raw cath rates for each HRR.
In order to calculate risk-adjusted cath rates that correct for potential regional
differences in patient severity, I adjust the raw regional cath rates based on indicators
for patient age, race, and sex. I further adjust for patient comorbidities using the
Elixhauser scheme, which is a widely used method for risk-adjustment in administra-
tive data and is the adjustment method preferred and supported by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (ElixhaIsr et al. , 1998; Quii et a., 20(). The
calculation of both raw and risk-adjusted regional 2-day cath rates is discussed in
more detail in subsection 1.3.1.
1.3 Empirical Evidence
I begin this section by providing descriptive statistics and graphs to help illuminate
the key variables used in my analyses and to motivate the design of the empirical
specifications. I then present the empirical specifications, describing how the param-
eters identify the degree of physician selective migration as well as the effect of the
environment on physician practice choices.
1.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Regional catheterization rates
The core analysis in this paper focuses on 2-day cardiac catheterization rates, as
discussed in subsection 1.2.1. Taible 1.1 provides the distribution of both raw and
risk-adjusted rates across all 306 HRRs for each year during the period of my analy-
sis (1992-2008), as well as for the period as a whole. Over this period, raw cath rates
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rise from a mean of 0.16 in 1992 to a mean of 0.52 in 2008. The mean and median
are approximately equal each year, implying that there are about as many regions
with above-average intensity as there are below-average intensity. Also, risk-adjusting
reduces the overall cross-regional standard deviation from 0.08 to 0.07 (12% reduc-
tion), suggesting that most of the variation in rates is not due to differences in the
average patient severity of the underlying populations. Finally, the absolute spread
of the cath rate distribution is relatively stable though perhaps narrowing slightly
over time, with a maximum standard deviation (interquartile range) of 0.10 (0.14) in
1996 and a minimum of 0.08 (0.11) in 2008.
The calculation of regional cath rates used in the analysis excludes the patients
used to measure the behavior of migrant cardiologists. This eliminates any mechanical
correlation between observed migrant cardiologist behavior and regional cath rates.
However, regional cath rates are calculated using Medicare's 100% inpatient stay
records, of which only a subset (5% before 1998, and 20% thereafter) can be linked
to the physicians providing services. Thus, some patients treated by migrants are
not excluded from the calculation of regional cath rates, leaving the possibility that
physician-specific effects of migrants could cause correlation between regional averages
and measured physician behavior. However, there are two reasons why any such effect
is unlikely to be significant in the current context. First, most migrant cardiologists
treat a relatively small share of patients in an HRR, as detailed in appendix Table 1.9,
making it unlikely that any given cardiologist moves the regional average by much.
Moreover, the key independent variable in the analysis is the change in regional cath
rates experienced across a cardiologist's move. If a cardiologist's individual impact
on the regional average is similar before and after move, the net effect after taking
differences will be small.
A key simplification I make in calculating regional cath rates is to define a time-
invariant cath intensity measure for each HRR, defined as the fraction of heart attack
patients in that HRR receiving a cath during the period 1992-2008. These regional
rates are are summarized in the last row of 1able 1. 1 and also in Figure 1-2. While the
secular trend in cath rates implies that cath rate levels are not directly comparable
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across years, the relative stability of the distributional spread over time implies that
differences in HRR cath rates are roughly comparable across years. Thus, to the
extent that the intensity of an HRR relative to the secular trend remains stable over
time, differences in HRR cath propensities over the pooled years will be the same
as the difference in propensity in any given year. In Appendix 1.7, I show that my
results are robust to allowing HRR-specific cath rates to vary over time.
Because regional cath rates form the basis for the primary dependent variable in
my analysis, it is worth briefly discussing the potential disadvantages and advantages
of using time-invariant cath rates. Related to the previous discussion, one disadvan-
tage is that if the relative intensity of an HRR changes over time (e.g. if HRRs have
different growth rates in their cath propensities), then the average regional intensity
ranking will be a noisy measure of the actual ranking in any given year. On the other
hand, an advantage of time-invariant rates is that they are calculated over a larger
sample, reducing sampling error which could bias estimates of the environment effect
toward zero. Another advantage is that time-invariant rates also reduce the extent
to which the style of any doctor or group of doctors influences the propensity to cath
in that region.
Cardiologist migration and environment exposure
The key identification in my analysis derives from migrant physicians experiencing
changes in their practice environment across a move. As described in section 1.2.2, I
identify a set of 2,704 physicians who move their practice across HRRs, comprising
15.1% of cardiologists in my sample. Table 1.2 summarizes the migration patterns
of these physicians. Over 75% of migrants move across states, and 40% move across
census regions. Over half the moves occur within the Midwest and South.
The change in a physician's practice environment experienced across a move is
calculated as A3 = (destination HRR cath intensity) - (origin HRR cath intensity)3 .
Because a large fraction of cardiologist moves occur in the Midwest and South where
there is rich geographic variation in regional cath rates, the migrants in my sample
face a wide spread of environment changes as shown in Fi ii reI 1 3. Raw environment
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changes range from -0.39 to 0.39 with an interquartile range of 0.14, while the slightly
less dispersed risk-adjusted changes range from -0.34 to 0.32 with an iqr of 0.12.
While Tale 1.2 describes regional migration volumes, it does not describe how
large the migrant physician populations are in each region relative to all physicians
practicing in that region. For this, I measure the proportion of cardiologists in each
census region that move either out of (emigration) or into (immigration) an HRR in
that region, relative to the total number of cardiologists who ever practice in that
region. As summarized in TIoble 1.3, the census regions with the highest proportion
of emigrants and immigrants (the Midwest and South) are also the regions with the
largest migration volumes shown in Table 1.2. The highest net emigration occurs out
of the Midwest (3.2%), and the highest net immigration occurs into the West (4.5%).
I also investigate the age at which cardiologists migrate, relative to the average age
distribution of non-migrants. To get at this, Toble 1.3 summarizes the span of years
between a migrant's completion of a cardiology disease (CD) fellowship and the move
observed in my sample, as well as the overall distribution of years since fellowship
completion for the non-migrant physician population. Half of migrants in my sample
move within 7 years of finishing CD training; the median number of years since CD
training for non-migrants in my sample is 14 years. The number of years since CD
training can also be roughly converted to physician age, since cardiologists who go
straight through typically finish training at age 32-33 (after college, physicians must
complete 4 years of medical school, 3 years internal medicine residency, and a 3 year
CD fellowship). Thus, the median migrant age in my sample is roughly 40, while the
median age of non-migrants is about 47.
1.3.2 Event Study
Event study specification
My primary empirical specification is an "event study" of physician treatment de-
cisions across a move. The key idea is to follow a physician in a long panel before
and after move, and to trace out the level and time pattern of behavior with respect
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to the move. By comparing migrants who start out in the same region, I test for
selective migration by observing whether the physicians who move to more intensive
regions were already practicing more intensively than average prior to the move, or
whether they started practicing more intensively shortly before the move. I then look
at the change in physician behavior across a move to identify the effect of a change in
environment on a physician's behavior. The key identifying assumption here is that
nothing other than the environment changes simultaneously with the move that is
correlated with the change in environment and also affects physician behavior.
The event study specification is constructed as follows. First, I measure each
migrant cardiologist's risk-adjusted cath behavior with respect to "event time" t,
where t is the number of years since the physician's move. Physician behavior is
further adjusted for calendar-time secular trends and physician cohort fixed effects
(based on year of graduation from CD fellowship) in order to make relevant event-time
comparisons across physicians. For each physician j who is "treated" with a change in
environment Aj, the essence of the event study is to trace out over time the difference
between physician j's adjusted behavior and the behavior of a "control" physician
(e.g. the average migrant in physician j's origin HRR), per unit difference in the
treatments (A - Acontroi,). The regression average of this scaled behavior difference
summarizes the comparison of physician behavior across a move, for physicians who
start in the same region but move to dissimilar regions.
Specifically, the event study is estimated using a patient-level regression where
the dependent variable (cath)it is an indicator for whether heart attack patient i,
treated by cardiologist j in event year t, received a cath within 2 days of hospi-
tal admission. This dependent variable, which describes physician behavior, is first
adjusted by including calendar year and cohort fixed effects as well as patient risk-
adjusters (age, race, sex, and comorbidity dummies). Each migrant's behavior is
then measured relative to a baseline migrant in the same origin HRR by includ-
ing a full set of physician origin HRR dummies and event time dummies 1(s = t).
Finally, the key interest is in how the migrant's change in environment explains
any remaining heterogeneity in physician practice style with respect to the move.
25
This is calculated by interacting a physician's (risk-adjusted) change in environment
Ai = (destination HRR cath intensity)j - (origin HRR cath intensity)j with the full
set of event time dummies 1(s = t). Focusing on migrant behavior in the window 8
years before and after move yields the regression equation
7
(cath)ijt = {origin HRR FEs}, + E [at1(s = t) + #A1(s = t)
+ { calendar year FEs}< + { cohort FEs} + { patient risk-adjusters}> + eist,
(1.1)
The main parameters of interest for my analysis are the #t coefficients. For a
given value of t, 3t describes the difference between treatment styles of physicians t
years since move per unit difference in Aj. If there is little selective migration, then
physician styles prior to move should not differ systematically with Aj, and thus #t
should be close to zero for all t < 0. For t > 0, #t describe how physician styles
diverge in relation to Aj after a move. In combination with the information on selec-
tive migration uncovered in pre-move behavior, post-move behavior informs us how
much physicians respond to changes in the environment. Namely, any break in the
level of /t across the move is informative about the extent of influence that the en-
vironment exerts on an individual physician's behavior. Moreover, the time pattern
of any environment effect is informative about the mechanisms underlying this effect:
instantaneous effects suggest that discrete factors such as the local availability of cap-
ital or peer effects are important determinants of physician style, whereas effects that
increase over time suggest that "slow-moving" factors such as learning or adaptation
play a role.
It is important to compare specification (1.1) with a slightly modified version of
the event study where origin HRR fixed effects are replaced by physician fixed effects.
When physician fixed effects are included, all changes in a physician's behavior over
event time are measured with respect to that physician's behavior in a baseline period,
chosen to be the year immediately before the move (implying #L 0). Because of
this normalization, the #t coefficients for years prior to the move no longer identify
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selective migration based on levels, though they will still capture differential trends.
For this reason, specification (1 ) with origin HRR fixed effects is my preferred
specification for evaluating selective migration.
A potential downside to specification (1.1), however, is that it essentially mea-
sures physician behavior within groups defined by origin and destination HRR pairs
(specifically, origin HRR dummies and Aj). This group-level definition of behavior
potentially confounds interpreting measured changes in #t over time as changes in
individual physician behavior. This could occur, for example, if physicians tend to
treat a higher volume of patients when the average practice intensity in their HRR
is closer to the physician's individual preferred style. In this case, even if individual
physicians changed their practice style little across a move, the average treatment
used by a group of physicians who move between the same origin and destination
HRRs could change significantly due to a compositional change in the fraction of
patients each physician treats. Including physician fixed effects resolves these types
of group-bias, and thus the event study modified to include physician fixed effects is
the appropriate specification for estimating changes in physician behavior over time.
Finally, I consider a third version of the event study which uses information on
non-migrant behavior to help estimate the calendar year and cohort fixed effects and
patient risk-adjusters. Specifically, I estimate (1.1) over all patients treated by car-
diologists (both migrants and non-migrants). As in the previous specification, I also
replace origin HRR fixed effects with physician fixed effects. Under the assumption
that cohort effects, calendar year shocks, and patient characteristics affect migrants
and non-migrants similarly, this full regression yields more efficient estimates of mi-
grant treatment effects.
While the flexible nature of the event study is very conducive to visually testing the
nature of selective migration and the size and time-pattern of environment effects, it
is slightly less conducive to providing a summary magnitude of the effects. Moreover,
getting precise estimates of physician behavior at every point in time places heavy
demands on sample size. Taking a difference-in-differences style approach helps over-
come both these deficiencies, and I implement this design in subsection 1.3.3. And
27
while the difference-in-differences design requires an assumption of parallel trends in
behavior relative to Az in the years before the move, the validity of this assumption
can be visually evaluated in the event-study framework by checking whether #t is
approximately constant for t < 0.
Event study results
Figiire 1-4 plots the sequence of #t estimates from the event study specification (1.1),
along with point-wise 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered at the
physician level. The striking pattern highlighted in this figure is that the sequence of
S3 estimates is roughly flat and close to zero before the move (t < 0) and then jumps
discretely at t = 0 and thereafter remains roughly flat near 0.67.
I focus first on the it coefficients for t < 0. These estimates show whether there
is any pre-move difference either in levels or trends between physician styles as a
function of where the physician moves (as described by the change in environment
Aj). In both cases the answer appears to be negative: the values of #it for t < 0
show no particular trend and are jointly not significantly different from zero at the
5% level.
The lack of observed selective migration greatly facilitates interpreting the changes
in physician behavior across the move for two reasons. First, the jump in physician
behavior across a move is the causal effect of the treatment (here, the experienced
change in environment) under a "parallel trends" assumption that differences in mi-
grant behavior would have remained unchanged absent the treatment. The lack of
any trend in this difference in the years leading up to the move strongly boosts the
plausibility of this assumption.
A second issue relates to the possibility that different types of migrants may sort
differentially to higher or lower intensity regions. This could raise the concern that,
for a given treatment, the effect on a migrant who chose that treatment may not be
the same for a migrant who did not choose that treatment. If, however, physicians
who started in the same region and later moved to dissimilar regions practiced no
differently before the move, it would rule out any (perhaps unobserved) sources of
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selective migration that are correlated with observed physician practice choices. This
is in fact what the results in Figure 1- suggest, given that #t 1 0 prior to the move.
Figures 1-15 and 1-6 show the results from the alternative event studies using
physician fixed effects and adding non-migrants, respectively. The estimated pattern
of physician behavior in both of these alternative specifications is qualitatively very
similar to the baseline event study results.
As already noted, the sequence of #t jumps instantaneously at t = 0, correspond-
ing precisely to the first year after a physician's move. This rejects the null hypoth-
esis that the environment has no effect on physician behavior (i.e. that physicians
are "stuck" in their ways), and shows that there is a significant and instantaneous
positive physician response to the new environment. The finding that there is no
further physician response to the environment-/t is flat for t > 0-suggests that
the nature of the physician response is not about slow moving factors, such as skill
development or learning. This stands in contrast, for example, to the hypothesis that
physicians styles evolve according to a Bayesian-learning process of adaptation (see
e.g. Phelps 4and M\1ooney, 1.993).
Finally, physician response to a change in the environment is bounded away from
unity, suggesting that physician behavior is not fully determined by the environment.
If HRRs appropriately characterize each physician's practice environment, #t ~ 2/3
for t > 0 implies that the environment matters about twice as much as the physician.
However, if HRRs mismeasure a physician's relevant practice region, the estimated
environment impact is only a lower bound. In subsection 1-.4 I explore this possibility
in more detail and estimate a lower bound of the physician-specific effect.
1.3.3 Difference-in-Differences
Difference-in-differences specification
As a supplement to the event study (see subisection 1.3.2), I now consider a difference-
in-differences (DD) approach to analyze of the effect of a change in environment on
physician behavior. This approach requires an "parallel trends" assumption that,
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absent a move, physician trends in behavior would have been the same for physicians
who in fact moved to more-intensive regions as those who moved to less-intensive
regions. The event study results in Figiire 1-4 boost the plausibility of this assumption
by validating that the assumption holds at least during the 8 years prior to a move
(since #t is roughly flat for t < 0).
While the DD approach inherits its validity from the event study, there are at least
two reasons for computing the DD estimate in addition to the event study. First, it
provides a single summary measure of the effect of experience. A second reason is
that by lumping observations before and after move, the DD effectively computes
the experience effect over a larger sample, yielding tighter estimates. Thus, the DD
provides more power for adding additional controls, and makes it easier to compare
the sensitivity of the results across different specifications.
The DD regression is very similar in nature to the event study regression (1.1).
As before, the dependent variable is 2-day patient cath (cath)ijt, and I normalize the
average cath rate in each origin HRR using a full set of physician origin HRR dummies.
To allow for common changes in migrant behavior across a move and also over time
with respect to calendar year, I inlcude an "after" dummy 1(t > 0) and dummies
for the calendar year in which the patient was treated. After adjusting rates based
on origin and time, we are interested in how the change in environment a physician
experiences across a move is related first to the physician's pre-move behavior (the
selective migration effect) and second to the physician's post-move behavior (selection
effect plus environment effect). Thus, selection is measured by including a direct effect
of the physician's change in environment Aj = (destination HRR cath intensity) -
(origin HRR cath intensity)j, while the environment effect is measured by interacting
A3 with the "after" dummy 1(t > 0). This yields the regression equation
(cath)ijt = {origin HRR dummies}3 + # 1 1(t > 0) + #2 Aj + #33A 31(t 0)
+ {calendar year FEs}i + {cohort FEs}, + { patient risk-adjusters}i + eit,
(1.2)
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where patient risk-adjusters include a detailed set of age, race, sex, and comorbidity
dummies.
The key parameters of interest in Equation (1.2) are #2, which describes the
degree of selective migration, and 03, which describes the effect of the environment
on physician behavior. If physicians who move to regions that are more (less) intensive
than their origin region practice more (less) intensively than their peers prior to the
move, the estimate for 02 will be positive. On the other hand, if a physician's tendancy
to move to a more or less intensive region is independent of their treatment choices
prior to the move, the estimate for #2 will be close to zero. The environment effect
33 measures the degree to which cardiologists alter their treatment decisions after a
move in response to a change in regional norms. If physician practice styles are fully
ingrained and do not respond to changes in the environment, #3 will be close to zero.
At the other extreme, #3 = 1 if physicians change their behavior 1-for-1 in response
to a change in regional norms.
I also consider two slight modifications to the baseline difference-in-differences
specification (1.2). In the first, I add destination HRR fixed effects to more flexibly
control for selection of physicians to different regions. Because A is a linear function
of regional treatment intensities which themselves are constant within HRR, the coef-
ficient on A is not separately identified when both origin and destination fixed effects
are included and is therefore dropped in this specification. The second modification I
consider is to replace HRR fixed effects with physician fixed effects. This specification
explicitly exploits the changes to individual migrant behavior across the move, and
avoids sources of group bias such as might come through volume effects (discussed in
greater detail in subsection 1.3.2).
Finally, I re-estimate each of these three specifications (equation (1.2) and the
two modifications) using both migrant and non-migrant physician data. This has
two primary benefits. First, it allows HRR, calendar year, cohort, and comorbidity
fixed effects to be estimated using all data, providing more efficient estimates under
the condition where these effects are the same for both migrants and non-migrants.
The second benefit is that it allows a direct comparison of migrant and non-migrant
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behavior. In particular, in the specifications without physician fixed effects, I will
estimate whether migrants are more or less intensive on average than non-migrants.
Difference-in-differences results
Table 1.4 presents the difference-in-differences results. Column (la) reports the base-
line DD estimates for Equation (1.2); column (2a) reports the results after the addition
of destination HRR fixed effects; and column (3(a) reports the results from replacing
HRR fixed effects with physician fixed effects. The final three columns (1b)-(3b) re-
port analagous results to specifications (la)-(3a), but are estimated over the full set
of migrant and non-migrant cardiologists.
First, the estimated degree of selective migration given by the main effect of A1
is very small and not significantly different from zero, implying that physicians who
moved to a higher-intensity region than where they originally practiced were no more
aggressive prior to the move than their peers who moved to lower-intensity regions.
This finding fits with the pattern of results from the event study (subsection 1.3.2)
described in Figure 1-4.
The primary estimate of interest in the DD specification is the change in physi-
cian behavior in response to a change in average regional treatment intensity, which
is given by the coefficient on the interaction of Aj and the "after" dummy 1(t > 0).
Focusing on the estimate from the physician fixed effects specification (column (la)),
a physician experiencing a 1 percentage point increase in the environment intensity
becomes 0.67 percentage points more likely to treat a patient intensively. Across all
specifications, this estimate remains relatively stable and statistically different from
both zero and one. This implies that the environment has a significant impact on
physician behavior while suggesting that physician-specific factors such as past ex-
perience play an important role in current treatment decisions. If the physician's
environment is measured with error, this is in fact an under-estimate of the environ-
ment impact, implying that the role of the environment is at least twice the role of
physician-specific factors. In the following section 1.3.4 I explore an upper bound on
the environment effect.
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Finally, the specifications that include both migrant and non-migrant physician
behavior are informative of whether migrants tend to be more or less intensive
than non-migrants. As shown by the coefficient on the "mover" dummy in columns
(1b)-(2b, migrant behavior is very similar to non-migrants on the whole. This sug-
gests that selection into the migrant sample is not driven by factors that are correlated
with a physician's practice intensity level.
1.3.4 Cross-section
Cross-section specification
The event study (section -1.3.2) and difference-in-differences (section 1.3.3) designs
above estimated physician response to a change in the environment to be less than
unity. This rejects the null hypothesis that physician behavior is fully characterized by
the physician's current practice environment only under the assumption that HRRs
do not mis-measure a physician's practice environment. Under mismeasurement,
however, the point estimates from these analyses could be biased toward zero. This
could arise from classical measurement error, or it could result from a world in which
physicians move to a random HRR but (conditional on HRR) choose to work in a
hospital that is most similar to the environment where they came from (in which
case the estimated change in environment based on HRR is systematically an over-
estimate). The main point of this section is to deal with this possibility by providing
a more-robust test of the null hypothesis that physicians are fully characterized by
their practice environment.
The key idea I exploit is that, under the hypothesis that physicians are fully
characterized by their environment, the treatment behavior of two physicians who
move to the same region (e.g. HRR or hospital) but who come from dissimilar regions
should not vary systematically based on where they came from. Whether this is the
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case can be tested using the cross-section regression equation
(cath)i= { environment dummies} + (origin HRR cath intensity)
+ { calendar year FEs}i + { cohort FEs}3 + { patient risk-adjusters} + eiy,
(1.3)
which is estimated over migrants only in the period after the move. The coefficient 0
describes the degree to which physicians in the same practice environment (as specified
by the choice of environment dummies) differ in their behavior per unit difference in
their previous practice environment. If there exists positive matching of physicians to
practice regions, the estimate of 0 will be a lower bound on the true estimate; thus,
any rejections of 0 = 0 hold even in the presence of positive matching.
I estimate equation (1.3) with the environment fixed effects defined first at the
HRR-level, and then at the hospital-level. The results are shown in Table 1.5, columns
(1b)-(2b). In both cases, the point estimates on (origin HRR cath intensity) are
significantly larger than zero, allowing us to reject at the 0.01 level the null hypothesis
that a physician behavior does not vary based on the intensity of the physician's
previous practice environment. This in turn rejects the hypothesis that physician
practice styles are fully characterized by the practice environment. Thus, while the
event study and difference-in-differences results suggest that environment influences
are at least twice as large as physician-specific influences, these latter effects have
measurable impacts on a physician's practice choices as well.
Doctor-patient sorting
The cross-section results (1.3.4) show that physicians systematically differ (even
within the same hospital) in their treatment decisions based on prior experience.
However, there is a remaining concern that these results are driven by patients being
sorted to doctors based on (potentially unobservable) clinical appropriateness in a
way that is correlated with a physician's background. In this section, I test the plau-
sibility of this concern by evaluating whether physicians from different backgrounds
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see patients with observably different levels of clinical appropriateness for intensive
heart attack management.
To do this, I first construct an index of patient clinical appropriateness for intensive
management. Similar to Cl1umdra and Stiger (2007), I define clinical appropriateness
using logistic regression of patient catheterization within 2 days of a heart attack.
Specifically, I estimate
Pr (cathiht) = G [oh + Oht + Xit.. (1.4)
Here, Oh is an indicator for the HRR h in which patient i was treated. This in-
dicator enters directly and also interacted with continuous calendar year t to allow
for arbitrary linear trends by HRR. Xit includes calendar year dummies, patient co-
morbidities, and comorbidities interacted with calendar year. The empirical index of
patient clinical appropriateness is obtained as the fitted values from (1.4) evaluated
at a baseline year and HRR.
Given the index of patient clinical appropriateness, I test whether two physicians
with different backgrounds but currently practicing in the same hospital systemati-
cally see patients with different levels of appropriateness. To get at this, I estimate
the regression
Pr(cath)ij = {hospital dummies} + O(origin HRR cath intensity)j
+ { calendar year FEs}; + { cohort FEs}3 + cjt, (1.5)
which is the same as Equation (L.3) except the dependent variable has been replaced
by the empirical appropriateness measure for patient i, and patient risk-adjusters
have been removed.
I estimate Equation (1.5) over migrants in the period following their move (the
same set of observations used to estimate ( l 3)). The resulting estimate of 0, reported
in Table 1.6, is not significantly different from zero. This implies that any differential
sorting of patients to doctors within the hospital and based on physician background
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cannot be correlated with the empirical clinical appropriateness measure. This sup-
ports the assumption that, within the hospital, sorting of heart attack patients to
the first cardiologist is limited. Thus, the difference in physician treatment choices
based on background appears to be driven by physician-specific propensities to treat
patients intensively, rather than by differences in the types of patients each physician
treats.
1.4 Characterizing Physician Behavior Changes
In section 1.3, I showed evidence that physician behavior responds strongly-but not
completely-to changes in the physician's environment. In this section, I explore in
more detail the nature of this change in behavior. This will not only help to more
fully characterize the changes in physician behavior, but will also help to test certain
prevailing theories for how physician styles are formed which often have distinct im-
plications for how physician behavior should respond to changes in the environment.
1.4.1 "Schools of Thought" Theory
A predominant theory used to explain the existence and persistence of regional prac-
tice variations is the Plhelps aind M\looney (1993) model of information diffusion and
physician learning. In this model, uncertainty and complexity regarding the efficacy
of various medical interventions ultimately lead to regional "schools of thought" con-
cerning what constitutes best practice. Physicians form initial practice styles based
on where they train in medical school. Over time, these practice styles evolve accord-
ing to a Bayesian learning process, as physicians update their beliefs based on local
community norms. In this model, variations in health care delivery arise from incom-
plete information. Deviations from the fully informed provision of care either through
over- or under-provision result in welfare losses. Determining whether this learning
model appears to explain variations in AMI care is thus important for whether we
should rely on its welfare implications.
An obvious implication of the learning model is that physicians will change behav-
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ior following a move across environments (as I find), but the model has two further
implications which I am able to test directly in my empirical context. First, migrants
should eventually converge to the new school of thought regardless of where they
came from. However, the patterns of behavior following a physician's move as given
by the event study 1.3.2 show that physicians partially conform their behavior to
a new environment instantaneously (which alone is difficult to explain in a learning
context) across a move, with little to no further convergence in the 8 years following
the move.
A second implication of this learning model is that physicians who move later in
their career should change their behavior less than physicians who move early in their
career. I test this by estimating a modification to the difference-in-differences equation
(1.2) which adds a triple interaction between Aj, the "after" dummy 1(t > 0), and
a linear time-since-fellowship variable tsfy (as well as all lower-order interactions of
these variables), giving
(cath)ijt = {origin HRR dummies}j + #3{Aj x 1(t > 0) x tsfj}
+ {main effects and two-way interactions of Az, 1(t > 0), tsf3 } .
+ {calendar year FEs}< + { cohort FEs}3 + { patient risk-adjusters} + Eijt.
(1.6)
The primary coefficient of interest is j, which describes how much more (or less)
a physician responds to a change in the environment for each additional year of
experience accumulated before the move. Estimation results for equation (1.6) are
reported in 'able 17. Estimating (1.6) as given gives fHRR1 0.018 (se-0.01),
which is significant at the 10% level. Re-estimating the same equation after replacing
the origin HRR dummies with physician fixed effects gives BUPIN - 0.008 (se=0.01),
which is positive but not statistically different from zero. Neither case supports-
and the first case marginally rejects-the hypothesis that physicians respond less to
changes in their environment occurring later in their career.
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1.4.2 Asymmetries
So far, the analysis of physician response to a change in practice environment has im-
posed a symmetric response between physicians who move to more-intensive regions
and physicians who move to less-intensive regions. However, depending on the pri-
mary environment-level mechanisms that drive physicians to change behavior across
a move, physician responses to an increase in the environment's intensity may differ
from the response to a decrease in intensity. For example, if a physician is accus-
tomed to a particular environment, a move to a region that is less intensive because
of restricted access to hospital capacity could plausibly have a larger impact on the
physician's practice style than a move to a region that is more intensive because of
easy access to capacity.
To investigate whether an increase in the intensity of a physician's practice en-
vironment leads to a larger or smaller change in physician behavior relative to a
decrease in the practice environment's intensity, I estimate a modified DD equation
(as in (1.2)), which interacts the treatment-after interaction AjI(t > 0) with an
indicator for whether Aj > 0. Specifically, I estimate the equation
(cath)iyt {origin HRR dummies}j + of{Aj x 1(t > 0) x 1(Aj > 0)}
+ {main effects and two-way interactions of Aj, 1(Aj > 0), (t > 0)}
+ {calendar year FEs}< + { cohort FEs}3 + { patient risk-adjusters} + erst.
(1.7)
The primary coefficient of interest is #, which describes how much more (or less) a
physician responds to a unit increase in the environment's intensity relative to a unit
decrease. Estimation results for equation (1 .7) are reported in Table 1.8, yielding
-0.11 (se=0.23). While the point estimate of / is negative (suggesting that
decreases in environment intensity has a larger impact than increases in intensity),
the estimate is too noisy to make this conclusion.
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1.5 Mechanisms
The results in section 1.3 suggest that the environment plays a dramatic role in how
physicians treat patients, raising the key question of what causes this effect. There
are a variety of ways in which a physician's environment could influence his decisions.
Here, I briefly discuss three possible mechanisms that are likely to be important in
the current context, including how my results shed light on how these factors are
likely to play a role.
Because invasive treatment of a heart attack requires the use of a specialized lab-
oratory setting and access to other hospital resources, the availability of these capital
resources may be an important driver of how cardiologists treat heart attack patients.
Due to their discrete nature, capacity constraints are likely to have an instantaneous
impact on physician behavior, which is consistent with changes in behavior observed
in the current study. An implication of the capacity constraint hypothesis is that re-
gions with higher capacity will have higher catheterization use rates, all other things
equal. Evidence from Gatsonis et al. (1995) does in fact find that states with more ex-
tensive on-site availability of cardiac catheterization have higher catheterization rates
after adjusting for patient characteristics. However, an interesting question which
merits further exploration is the degree to which these capacity constraints operate
at the hospital level versus the region (e.g. HRR) at large.
(Ihandra an(d Staiger (2007) find evidence that the environment may also influence
physician decisions through productivity spillovers. These spillovers could occur at
the regional level, such as from knowledge spillovers across physicians practicing in
the same region or by attracting physicians who have specialized in certain types
of treatments. Spillovers could also occur at the physician level, through learning-
by-doing and skill specialization (perhaps as a function of the underlying patient
population). The current paper does not rule out physician-level spillover effects-
physicians change their behavior less than one-for-one in response to a change in the
environment, which could be a result of embedded habits or skills. However, my
results do speak to how regional-level spillovers are likely to occur. First, given the
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very limited degree of physician sorting that I find, it appears that the attraction of
specialized physicians to particular regions (at least at the level of the HRR) is quite
small in this context." To the degree that knowledge spillovers occur across physicians,
these appear to occur in a manner that changes physician behavior immediately after
a move with no further effect. Finally, it is worth noting that capacity constraints
can be related to regional productivity spillovers: hospitals or regions may induce
physician specialization by accumulating a stock of capital that targets a particular
treatment.
Finally, I consider how the environment may influence physician behavior through
"team" effects. Due to the emergency nature of heart attacks and the time-sensitivity
of the relative benefits of different treatment paths, optimal patient treatment may
depend on the speed and accuracy of preliminary diagnoses by the triage and emer-
gency room staff. Moreover, the probability of complications as a result of invasive
treatment and the ability to identify and cope with such complications could depend
on the skill of cardiac catheterization lab technicians, hospital nurses, and surgical
staff. Thus, the factors specific to the team of physicians and hospital staff involved in
the care of the heart attack patient may also play an important role in a cardiologist's
treatment behavior. Moreover, due to their discrete nature across practice settings,
team factors are also consistent with the observed level-shift in physician behavior
across a move.
1.6 Conclusion
Cardiologists vary widely across U.S. regions in their propensity to intensively man-
age heart attacks, even after adjusting for apparent differences in average patient
characteristics and illness severity across regions. Such variation could result from
differences in local practice environments, such as access to hospital capacity, the
availability of specialists, and medical malpractice exposure. On the other hand,
4This limited selective migration applies to physicians moving later in their career. It is un-
known whether the degree of selective migration differs for cardiologists moving directly out of their
cardiology fellowship.
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the regional differences could be driven entirely by physician-specific factors such as
training, preferences, and experience as a result of positive matching of physicians to
other physicians with similar practice styles.
This paper attempts to identify the role of the environment on a cardiologist's
behavior relative to physician-specific factors by exploiting changes in practice en-
vironment resulting from cardiologist migration. Using 17 year of Medicare data,
migrant treatment choices can be traced in a long panel before and after a move.
Positive sorting is identified by the degree to which physicians who start off in the
same region and later move to dissimilar regions were already practicing dissimilarly
before the move. The environment effect is identified by the change in physician
behavior across the move.
I find that both environment and physician-specific factors impact a physician's
practice style, but the role of the environment is at least twice as large. Moreover, I
find that the pattern of physician behavior changes across a move is not consistent
with the "schools of thought" model often used to describe regional differences in
medical practice. Finally, seeking to more precisely pin down the mechanisms that
drive physician behavior is an important next step. The results in this paper suggest
that looking to the physician's environment for these mechanisms is likely to be the
most promising place to shine the light.
41
Figure 1-1: Distribution of 2-day cath rates by HRR.
No data
14.8% - <31.9% (62)
31.9% - <37.1% (61)
37.1% - >41.6% (61)
41.6% - <46.8% (61)
46.8% - <68.0% (61)
Notes: Geographic distribution of raw 2-day cath rates by HRR calculated over pooled years 1992-
2008 and weighted by number of patients treated in each region during this period.
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Figure 1-3: Distribution of changes A in regional cath rates for migrant cardiologists.
Weighted by number of patients treated by each doctor.
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Figure 1-4: Event Study
Migrant cardiologists only, origin HRR fixed effects
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
t = event time
Notes: Graph plots estimates of physician practice style t years since move relative to the average
style of migrants from the same pre-move HRR also t years since move, as explained by the physi-
cian's change in environment A, = (destination HRR cath intensity), -(origin HRR cath intensity),
across the move. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals constructed from standard errors clustered
at the physician level. Cath rates risk-adjusted by age, race, sex, and Elixhauser comorbitities.
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Figure 1-5: Event Study
Migrant cardiologists only, physician fixed effects
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t event time
Notes: Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals constructed from standard errors clustered at the
physician level. Physician fixed effects included, so base period of t = -1 normalized to zero. Cath
rates risk-adjusted by age, race, sex, and Elixhauser comorbitities.
Figure 1-6: Event Study
Both migrant and non-migrant cardiologists, physician fixed effects
r)
C U
a)
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 $ 2 3 4 5 6 7
t= event time
Notes: Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals constructed from standard errors clustered at the
physician level. Physician fixed effects included, so base period of t = -1 normalized to zero. Cath
rates risk-adjusted by age, race, sex, and Elixhauser comorbitities.
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Table 1.1: Distribution of 2-Day Cath Rates Across HRRs 1992-2008
Raw Cath Rates Risk-Adjusted Cath Rates
year mean (stdev) median (iqr) mean (stdev) median (iqr) # HRRs
1992 0.160 (0.080) 0.157 (0.116) 0.160 (0.077) 0.158 (0.110) 306
1993 0.190 (0.087) 0.189 (0.127) 0.190 (0.083) 0.187 (0.121) 306
1994 0.229 (0.095) 0.217 (0.127) 0.229 (0.090) 0.214 (0.123) 306
1995 0.270 (0.099) 0.269 (0.134) 0.270 (0.093) 0.268 (0.123) 306
1996 0.308 (0.102) 0.298 (0.140) 0.308 (0.096) 0.298 (0.121) 306
1997 0.332 (0.101) 0.325 (0.137) 0.332 (0.092) 0.329 (0.118) 306
1998 0.345 (0.095) 0.335 (0.120) 0.345 (0.086) 0.339 (0.100) 306
1999 0.356 (0.092) 0.353 (0.118) 0.356 (0.082) 0.354 (0.104) 306
2000 0.375 (0.092) 0.370 (0.116) 0.375 (0.078) 0.372 (0.093) 306
2001 0.402 (0.093) 0.407 (0.115) 0.402 (0.078) 0.406 (0.098) 306
2002 0.433 (0.089) 0.438 (0.114) 0.433 (0.074) 0.436 (0.091) 306
2003 0.453 (0.088) 0.451 (0.115) 0.453 (0.070) 0.458 (0.087) 306
2004 0.485 (0.087) 0.489 (0.114) 0.485 (0.068) 0.485 (0.093) 306
2005 0.503 (0.084) 0.498 (0.115) 0.503 (0.065) 0.502 (0.077) 306
2006 0.504 (0.085) 0.502 (0.116) 0.504 (0.064) 0.505 (0.086) 306
2007 0.512 (0.079) 0.509 (0.120) 0.512 (0.060) 0.509 (0.085) 306
2008 0.517 (0.080) 0.515 (0.109) 0.517 (0.062) 0.509 (0.079) 306
1992-2008 0.370 (0.083) 0.374 (0.110) 0.370 (0.073) 0.371 (0.094) 306
Note: The statistics reported are from the distribution of 2-day cath rates across HRRs, weighted
by the number of heart attack patients in each HRR that year. Risk-adjusted cath rates have been
adjusted using age, race, and sex dummies, as well as the Elixhauser comorbidities.
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Table 1.2: Migration Patterns
Destination Census Region
Origin Northeast Midwest South West Total
Northeast 261 64 147 42 514
Midwest 55 460 225 96 836
South 91 123 691 126 1,031
West 21 50 50 202 323
Total 428 697 1,113 466 2,704
# (%)
Same State 652 (24%)
Same Census Division 1,167 (43%)
Same Census Region 1,614 (60%)
Note: Top panel shows the number of migrant cardiologists in my sample, based on origin and
destination census regions. Bottom panel shows number of migrants who remain within certain
geographic regions. By construction, all physicians in this sample move their practice across HRRs.
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Table 1.3: Comparison of migrant cardiologists to non-migrants
Geographyt Years Since Fellowshipt Female US Born
migrants non-migs migrants non-migs migrants non-migs
Census Region % out % in p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p7 5
Northeast 10.5% 8.7% 4 8 16 8 15 21 9.5% 5.0% 66.0% 68.4%
Midwest 19.3% 16.1% 4 7 14 8 14 21 5.4% 4.6% 57.9% 61.2%
South 15.1% 16.3% 4 7 12 7 12 19 6.5% 4.2% 58.6% 65.0%
West 10.3% 14.8% 4 8 17 9 15 22 5.4% 6.3% 65.6% 63.2%
Total 14.1% 14.1% 4 7 14 8 14 20 6.5% 4.8% 60.3% 64.6%
tThe geography comparison provides the fraction of emigrants (out-migrants) and imigrants (in-
migrants) to total physicians in each region. Migrants move across HRRs, though need not move
across regional boundaries. A value of zero for % emigrants (immigrants) corresponds to no migrants
moving out of (into) an HRR in that region during the period of analysis. Total % migrants in the
final row is less than the 15.1% figure from section 1.2.2, since some non-migrants (1.4%) practice
in multiple HRRs across regional boundaries.
IYears-since-fellowship is measured for migrants with respect to the cardiologist's cardiology fellow-
ship completion and move dates; statistics are weighted by the number of patients each migrant
treats in the sample. For non-migrants, years-since-fellowship are physician-patient specific and
based on cardiologist fellowship completion and patient hospital admission dates; statistics are cal-
culated over all non-migrant physician-patient pairs. For both migrants and non-migrants, region is
determined by where patient is treated.
47
Table 1.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Dependent variable: (cath)i E {0, 1}, indicating cath within 2 days
Migrant Cardiologist Sample Full Cardiologist Sample
(la) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
(mover) -0.010 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) -
after 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.018** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.018*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
A 0.005 0.058
(0.065) (0.058)
A * (after) 0.614*** 0.630*** 0.666*** 0.605*** 0.610*** 0.669***
(0.069) (0.065) (0.076) (0.071) (0.068) (0.075)
HRRIFEs -1/ / /
HRR2 FEs /
UPIN FEs V/
Year FEs /
Cohort FEs -I/ /
Comorbidities V /
N (physicians) 2,704 2,704 2,704 17,935 17,935 17,935
N (patients) 51,636 51,636 51,636 360,121 360,121 360,121
Notes: Patient-level observations. Dependent variable (cath)i indicates whether patient received
cath within 2 days of hospital admission. A is the change in regional cath rates across a physician's
move. Standard errors clustered at the physician (UPIN) level shown in parentheses. *: p < 0.10;
**: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. Patient comorbidities include age, race, and sex dummies, as well as
the Elixhauser comorbidities.
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Table 1.5: Cross-Section Estimates
Dependent variable: (cath)ij E {0, 1}, indicating cath within 2 days
No Risk Adjustment Risk Adjustment
(la) (2a) (1b) (2b)
(origin HRR cath intensity)j 0.280*** 0.202*** 0.256*** 0.193***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063)
destination HRR FEs
hospital FEs
Year FEs / / / /
Cohort FEs / //
Comorb FEs /
Notes: Patient-level observations. N 32, 900 in all regressions. Dependent variable (cath)ij
indicates whether patient received cath within 2 days of hospital admission. Independent variable
(origin HRR cath intensity)j is the raw (not risk-adjusted) rate in columns (la) and (2a), and is the
risk-adjusted rate in columns (lb) and (2b). Risk-adjusted cath rates have been adjusted using age,
race, and sex dummies, as well as the Elixhauser comorbidities. Standard errors clustered at the
physician (UPIN) level shown in parentheses. *: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Cross-Section Doctor-Patient Sorting Estimates
Dependent variable: Pr(cath)ij c (0, 1)
(origin HRIR cath intensity), 0.028
(0.025)
hospital FEs /
Year FEs /
Cohort FEs /
Notes: Patient-level observations. N = 32, 900. Dependent variable Pr(cath)ij provides an empirical
measure of patient appropriateness for cath within 2 days of hospital admission. Independent variable
(origin HRR cath intensity), is the risk-adjusted rate. Standard errors clustered at the physician
(UPIN) level shown in parentheses. *: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Differential environment response by years (tsf) since physician completed
cardiology fellowship
Dependent variable: (cath)i E {0, 1}
Aj x (after) x (tsf)j 0.018* 0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
main effects {A, (after), (tsj)} V' /
two-way effects {LA, (after), (tsf)} / I
HRR1 FEs /
UPIN FEs /
Year, Cohort FEs /
Comorbidities /
Notes: Patient-level observations. N = 51,636. Dependent variable (cath)i indicates whether
patient received cath within 2 days of hospital admission. A is the change in regional cath rates across
a physician's move. Standard errors clustered at the physician (UPIN) level shown in parentheses.
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. Patient comorbidities include age, race, and sex dummies,
as well as the Elixhauser comorbidities.
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Table 1.8: Degree
ment intensity
of asymmetric response to an increase versus decrease in environ-
Dependent variable: (cath)i E {0, 1}
A x (after) x 1(Aj > 0) -0.11
(0.23)
main effects {Aj, (after), 1(Aj > 0)} /
two-way effects {Aj, (after), 1(Aj > 0)} /
HRR1 FEs /
Year, Cohort FEs /
Comorbidities /
Notes: Patient-level observations. N = 51, 636. Dependent variable (cath)i indicates whether
patient received cath within 2 days of hospital admission. A is the change in regional cath rates across
a physician's move. Standard errors clustered at the physician (UPIN) level shown in parentheses.
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. Patient comorbidities include age, race, and sex dummies,
as well as the Elixhauser comorbidities.
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1.7 Appendix A: Time-Varying Cath Rates
The baseline analysis above used time-invariant measures of regional intensity to
measure the change in intensity a physician experiences across a move. However, as
discussed in subsection L.3.1, if regional intensity with respect to the national secular
trend changes over time, then measuring regions as having a time-invarient intensity
may introduce measurement error into the key independent variable in my analysis
Aj = (destination HRR cath intensity)j - (origin HRR cath intensity)j, biasing the
estimated environment effects toward zero. I address this issue directly in this ap-
pendix section, by seeing whether my results change if I allow Aj to depend on the
date when the physician moves.
First, I check whether it appears that regional intensities are stable relative to
the national average over time. To do this, I begin by calculating the raw and risk-
adjusted cath rates for each HRR in each year. This gives me an annual intensity
measure for each HRR. I then investigate whether the annual rank-order given by each
of these annual intensity measures is preserved over time. The idea is that if rank-
order is preserved, then the intensity measures for any two years should be positively
monotonically related. I report non-parametric correlation measures for pair-wise
comparisons of all years in Table L1,10 for the raw intensity measures; relsults are
very similar for the risk-adjusted measures, suggesting that any differences in rank
order are not driven by changes in the patient populations. The results in Tiable 1.10
show that the rank-order is not fully preserved across years; the fact that the non-
parametric correlations drop over time suggests that regions really do change their
intensity relative to the secular trend over time, rather than being driven entirely
by sampling error (which would result in correlations less than one, but stable over
time).
These results suggest that it may be important to construct time-varying regional
cath measures. The first measure I use is the year-specific HRR cath intensity defined
above, adjusted to remove the year-specific national average intensity. While year-
specific HRR cath rates eliminate measurment error resulting from the assumption
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of regional intensity stability over time, they can introduce other measurement error
through the fact that they are calculated over a single year of observations rather
than 17 years. Thus, I also calculate and alternative year-specific HRR intensity
measure by taking the predicted year-specific intensity from a model that predicts
the year-specific de-trended rate for each HRR as a function of a full interaction of
HRR dummies with a linear time trend. This yields a fitted year-specific de-trended
rate for each HRR.
Figure 1 -7 compares how the results of the event study in subsection 1.3.2 change
when the measure of Aj calculated using time-invariant regional cath intensities is
replace by a measure calculated with the time-specific de-trended HRR rates specific
to when the physician moved out of the origin HRR and into the destination HRR.
Column 2 of Figure 1-7 shows the results using the year-specific de-trended HRR
rates, while column 3 shows the results using the fitted year-specific de-trended rate
for each HRR.
The results from columns 2 and 3 in Figutre 1-7 are qualitatively very similar
to the baseline results reported in column 1, suggesting that using a time-invariant
regional cath measure does not introduce much measurement error. In fact, the
results from the time-varying cath rates if anything show slightly smaller estimated
effects of a physician behavior response to a change in environment. This suggests
that any reductions in measurement error from moving to time-varying regional cath
rates may be outweighed by increased sampling error in the estimated regional cath
intensity measures.
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1.8 Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 1-7: Event study, comparing result of time-invarient and time-varying mea-
sures of regional intensity.
Unadjusted
baseline intensity change A
-8-7-&5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
t = Years Since Move
Risk-adjusted
baseline intensity change A
.0
:Qr
Unadjusted
annual intensity change A
T
-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
t = Years Since Move
Risk-adjusted
annual intensity change A
Unadjusted
predicted intensity change A
lily'
-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
t = Years Since Move
Risk-adjusted
predicted intensity change A
CL'
U)
-7 ears4-32-'10 1 2 3 4 5 Mov
t = Years Since Move
.0
a
t = Years Since Move
-8-7-6-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
t= Years Since Move
Notes: Each cell plots estimates of physician practice style t years since move relative to the average
style of migrants from the same pre-move HRR also t years since move, as explained by the physi-
cian's change in environment A3 = (destination HRR cath intensity), - (origin HRR cath intensity)j
across the move, where each column uses a different method for defining HRR cath intensities. Row
1 uses raw changes in environment intensity, while Row 2 uses risk-adjusted changes. (Column 1,
Row 2 simply re-plots the baseline results from Figure 1-4 for comparison.) Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals constructed from standard errors clustered at the physician level. Standard
errors are not adjusted to account for fitted values of regional intensity measures in column 3.
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Table 1.9: Distribution
and after (02) move
of migrant cardiologist share of patients in HRR before (01)
Pctl 01 02 max(01, 0 2 )
1 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005
5 0.0003 0.0004 0.0011
10 0.0004 0.0007 0.0017
25 0.0011 0.0017 0.0036
50 0.0028 0.0047 0.0082
75 0.0079 0.0119 0.0177
90 0.0185 0.0281 0.0382
95 0.0321 0.0435 0.0571
99 0.0831 0.0860 0.1099
Mean 0.0081 0.0107 0.0157
Obs 2704 2704 2704
Note: Physician shares calculated using 1992-2008 CMS Carrier files, which are a 5% sample of
patients from 1992-1997 and a 20% sample thereafter. The total number of patients treated in each
IJRR was calculated by summing over patients inversely weighted by the corresponding Carrier file
sample probability p E {.05,.20}. The number of patients treated by a cardiologist in a given HRR
was calculated as the sum over patients weighted by 1/(Np), where N is the number of cardiologists
treating the patient on the first day.
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Table 1.10: Kendall Ta and Spearman non-parametric rank correlation coefficients for annual regional intensity measures
Panel A: Kendall , RankOrder Coefficient
year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1992
1993 0.79 (.02)
1994 0.72 (.02) 0.78 (.02)
1995 0.66 (.02) 0.71 (.02) 0.79 (.02)
1996 0.62 (.02) 0.67 (.02) 0.75 (.02) 0.80 (.01)
1997 0.58 (.03) 0.62 (.03) 0.67 (.02) 0.73 (.02) 0.80 (.01)
1998 0.53 (.03) 0.57 (.03) 0.63 (.02) 0.66 (.02) 0.72 (.02) 0.78 (.02)
1999 0.50 (.03) 0.52 (.03) 0.58 (.03) 0.61 (.02) 0.67 (.02) 0.73 (.02) 0.78 (.02)
2000 0.49 (.03) 0.50 (.03) 0.55 (.03) 0.58 (.03) 0.63 (.02) 0.69 (.02) 0.73 (.02) 0.78 (.02)
2001 0.46 (.03) 0.47 (.03) 0.52 (.03) 0.55 (.03) 0.61 (.02) 0.65 (.02) 0.68 (.02) 0.72 (.02) 0.78 (.02)
2002 0.41 (.04) 0.43 (.04) 0.47 (.03) 0.49 (.03) 0.55 (.03) 0.60 (.03) 0.62 (.03) 0.66 (.02) 0.71 (.02) 0.76 (.02)
2003 0.37 (.04) 0.38 (.04) 0.43 (.03) 0.44 (.03) 0.51 (.03) 0.55 (.03) 0.57 (.03) 0.60 (.03) 0.65 (.02) 0.70 (.02) 0.76 (.02)
2004 0.33 (.04) 0.33 (.04) 0.37 (.03) 0.40 (.03) 0.46 (.03) 0.49 (.03) 0.52 (.03) 0.53 (.03) 0.60 (.03) 0.65 (.02) 0.68 (.02) 0.75 (.02)
2005 0.33 (.03) 0.33 (.04) 0.37 (.03) 0.39 (.03) 0.46 (.03) 0.48 (.03) 0.50 (.03) 0.52 (.03) 0.58 (.03) 0.62 (.02) 0.66 (.02) 0.74 (.02) 0.76 (.02)
2006 0.32 (.04) 0.33 (.04) 0.36 (.03) 0.38 (.03) 0.45 (.03) 0.47 (.03) 0.48 (.03) 0.50 (.03) 0.54 (.03) 0.60 (.03) 0.64 (.02) 0.69 (.02) 0.71 (.02) 0.77 (.01)
2007 0.29 (.04) 0.30 (.04) 0.34 (.04) 0.35 (.03) 0.40 (.03) 0.43 (.03) 0.46 (.03) 0.46 (.03) 0.50 (.03) 0.56 (.03) 0.60 (.03) 0.66 (.02) 0.66 (.02) 0.73 (.02) 0.77 (.02)
2008 0.26 (.04) 0.26 (.04) 0.30 (.04) 0.32 (.04) 0.37 (.03) 0.40 (.03) 0.42 (.03) 0.42 (.03) 0.47 (.03) 0.51 (.03) 0.54 (.03) 0.61 (.02) 0.62 (.02) 0.68 (.02) 0.69 (.02) 0.71 (.02)
Panel B: Spearman Rank-Order Coefficient
year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1992
1993 0.93 (.02)
1994 0.89 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
1995 0.85 (.03) 0.88 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
1996 0.81 (.03) 0.84 (.03) 0.91 (.02) 0.94 (.02)
1997 0.76 (.04) 0.79 (.04) 0.85 (.03) 0.90 (.03) 0.94 (.02)
1998 0.72 (.04) 0.75 (.04) 0.81 (.03) 0.84 (.03) 0.89 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
1999 0.68 (.04) 0.70 (.04) 0.77 (.04) 0.80 (.03) 0.85 (.03) 0.90 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
2000 0.66 (.04) 0.67 (.04) 0.73 (.04) 0.76 (.04) 0.82 (.03) 0.86 (.03) 0.89 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
2001 0.63 (.04) 0.64 (.04) 0.71 (.04) 0.73 (.04) 0.80 (.03) 0.84 (.03) 0.86 (.03) 0.89 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
2002 0.57 (.05) 0.59 (.05) 0.65 (.04) 0.66 (.04) 0.74 (.04) 0.78 (.04) 0.81 (.03) 0.84 (.03) 0.89 (.03) 0.92 (.02)
2003 0.53 (.05) 0.53 (.05) 0.59 (.05) 0.62 (.05) 0.69 (.04) 0.73 (.04) 0.75 (.04) 0.77 (.04) 0.83 (.03) 0.88 (.03) 0.92 (.02)
2004 0.47 (.05) 0.48 (.05) 0.52 (.05) 0.56 (.05) 0.64 (.04) 0.67 (.04) 0.70 (.04) 0.71 (.04) 0.78 (.04) 0.83 (.03) 0.86 (.03) 0.92 (.02)
2005 0.48 (.05) 0.47 (.05) 0.53 (.05) 0.55 (.05) 0.63 (.04) 0.65 (.04) 0.67 (.04) 0.70 (.04) 0.76 (.04) 0.81 (.03) 0.85 (.03) 0.91 (.02) 0.92 (.02)
2006 0.46 (.05) 0.46 (.05) 0.51 (.05) 0.55 (.05) 0.62 (.05) 0.64 (.04) 0.66 (.04) 0.67 (.04) 0.72 (.04) 0.78 (.04) 0.82 (.03) 0.87 (.03) 0.89 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
2007 0.42 (.05) 0.42 (.05) 0.48 (.05) 0.50 (.05) 0.56 (.05) 0.59 (.05) 0.63 (.04) 0.64 (.04) 0.69 (.04) 0.74 (.04) 0.79 (.04) 0.85 (.03) 0.84 (.03) 0.90 (.03) 0.93 (.02)
2008 0.38 (.05) 0.38 (.05) 0.43 (.05) 0.46 (.05) 0.53 (.05) 0.56 (.05) 0.59 (.05) 0.59 (.05) 0.65 (.04) 0.69 (.04) 0.73 (.04) 0.81 (.03) 0.81 (.03) 0.87 (.03) 0.87 (.03) 0.89 (.03)
Notes: Table gives the Kendall Ta (Panel A) and Spearman (Panel B) coefficients corresponding to each pair of annual regional unadjusted intensity
measures (standard errors in parentheses). When two rankings have a monotonic and positive relationship, both the Kendall and Spearman coefficients
are equal to 1, whereas they are both zero when the rankings are independent. The Kendall r,, also has a convenient interpretation for any value riot
equal to zero or 1: for any two rank-order measures, the corresponding r,, coefficient describes how iuch more likely (in percentage points) the two
orderings will agree than disagree for any two randomly selected observations.
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Chapter 2
The Influence of Pioneer
Investigators on Technology
Adoption: Evidence from New
Cancer Drugs*
2.1 Introduction
Adoption of new health care technologies is widely considered to be a key driver of
both rising health costs and improved outcomes in the United States. In addition,
variation in the adoption rates of new technologies has been linked to the substan-
tial heterogeneity in hospital productivity that underlies the national trends towards
higher spending and greater longevity (Skiimmei nd Stiiger, 2009). One key ques-
tion is the role of agglomeration economies and Marshallian knowledge spillovers in
determining these patterns of technology adoption and accompanying productivity
differences.
If differences in technology adoption across hospitals are driven in part by knowl-
*This chapter is co-authored with Leila Agha. We would like to thank Amitabh Chandra, Joseph
Doyle, Amy Finkelstein, and Jonathan Gruber, as well as seminar participants at MIT for helpful
comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the National Institute on Aging, grant
number T32-AGO00186.
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edge spillovers, then we may expect proximity to the principal investigator of a
new technology to have a large and persistent effect on the area's propensity to
adopt. Macroeconomic models suggest that small differences in barriers to adop-
tion can generate large disparities in technology diffusion and economic productiv-
ity (PaIrclte a.nd Prescott, 119I, 2006). Recent work has suggested a critical role
for knowledge spillovers in technology adoption and productivity (Crespi et al., 2008;
Comin and Haljn, 2004, 2010), and there is evidence of localized spillovers within the
US from the citation patterns of patents (Jaffe. Trajtenberg. aniid Hlendersoii, 1993).
However, there is little evidence to date on the role of geographic networks in the
adoption of medical technologies.
In this paper, we examine the impact of having a nearby principal investigator
on the regional propensity to use a new chemotherapy agent. Principal investigators
(PIs) of the critical clinical trial for a new drug should be among the best informed
physicians about the drug's efficacy and applications immediately after drug introduc-
tion. We find that being treated in a hospital referral region where the PI practices
within three years after the drug's FDA approval increases the propensity to receive
a new drug by about 3 percentage points, from a mean of 10 percentage points. Re-
gional prescribing patterns converge and by the fourth and fifth year following drug
approval, there are no longer statistical differences between PI regions and the rest
of the country. Thus, in this context, despite significant short-run differences in uti-
lization, there is no evidence that early access to information about a drug's efficacy
is correlated with long-term differences in adoption.
The findings are estimated from a novel data set that identifies the authors of
the key clinical trials for 21 new chemotherapy drugs, as well as Medicare claims
records from over 600,000 patient chemotherapy care episodes from 1998-2008. We
exploit variation in the location of PIs across different drugs to estimate the impact of
proximity to a PI on prescribing patterns, after controlling for the regional propensity
to prescribe new chemotherapy agents and the national utilization patterns of each
particular drug. Our main analysis is performed at the level of the 306 hospital
referral regions (HRRs) defined by the Dartmouth Atlas.
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We probe the geographic scope of these findings, demonstrating that while there is
markedly higher initial usage within the PI's HRR, this is not driven by the prescribing
patterns of the PI himself. Neighboring HRRs do not experience significantly higher
levels of utilization, suggesting that the main effect is through physicians who practice
at or come into regular contact with the same tertiary care center as the PI. Moreover,
we use an instrumental variables strategy to show that the observed increase in use is
not driven by solely by re-sorting of patients with high latent demand for the new drug
into the PI's region, although there is evidence that patients do travel into regions
containing study authors with greater frequency after drug introduction.
There is substantial evidence that variation in the adoption of certain medical
technologies is not fully explained by economic incentives independent of geogra-
phy. Baickei and Chandra (2010) provide a good overview of the literature, and
demonstrate that current changes in quality of care in a particular HRR are cor-
related with previous period quality changes in neighboring HRRs. Soumerai t al.
(1998) show in a randomized trial that providing information to "opinion" leaders
within a hospital can result in large improvements in the treatment of heart at-
tacks in the ten months after the intervention. Both papers build on classic work by
(olemain. Katz. and Menzel (1957) that found that physician's social networks played
a key role in new drug adoption over a 15-month period. This research has several
advantages over earlier work including: transparent variation in the location of early
expertise for a new technology; the inclusion of 21 new drug introductions allowing
estimation over a broad sample of innovations; and an 11-year study period allowing
estimation of the fadeout of any measured spillover effects.
A key feature of the empirical context is that there may be substantial uncertainty
about the efficacy and appropriate applications of a newly introduced drug; the PI's
detailed knowledge of drug mechanisms, patient responses and side effects may put
him at a significant informational advantage in the early stages of a drug's diffusion.
Many drugs in this sample are approved based on promising preliminary evidence
for a narrowly defined indication before the completion of a large-scale randomized
trial. For example, many clinical trials are conducted on patients whose cancers
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have relapsed after initial chemotherapeutic treatment, so the efficacy of the drug as
an initial treatment is not yet established upon drug approval. In addition, many
chemotherapy drugs come with side effects that range from temporary but severely
uncomfortable (e.g. nausea, fever, pain) to serious or life-threatening (e.g. kidney
failure, lung damage, nerve damage, secondary cancers). A host of other drugs and
additional monitoring may be required to mitigate these side effects, and physicians
may develop expertise in this management over time.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Se(ction 2.2 de-
scribes the empirical context and key data elements. Section 2.3 lays out the primary
empirical strategies and results. Section 2.4 probes the extent to which the main
specification findings are driven by patient sorting or changes in physician behavior.
Seetion 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Setting and Data
There are two key data elements necessary for our analysis: the utilization of new
chemotherapy drugs across regions over time, and the location of principal investi-
gators who lead the pivotal clinical trials on which each drug's initial FDA approval
was based.
2.2.1 Measuring chemotherapy use
We measure chemotherapy diffusion using Medicare Part B reimbursement claims over
the 11-year period 1998-2008. Over the period of our study, 21 new chemotherapy
agents covered by traditional Medicare were approved by the FDA. The diffusion of
these drugs forms the basis of our analysis.
While traditional Medicare does not pay for most outpatient prescription drugs,
an exception is made for drugs that are not typically self-administered, including
chemotherapy drugs administered intravenously or intramuscularly. These expenses
have comprised a rising proportion of Medicare spending in recent years. In 2004,
Medicare Part B spent $11 billion on drugs, a category dominated by chemotherapy
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expenses; these costs rose 267% in the 7-year period since 1997, as compared to a
47% rise in total Medicare spending (Bach, 2009). The growth has been driven by
both the rapid growth in the prices charged for new chemotherapeutic agents and
rising rates of drug use.
We analyze drug use at the level of a Hospital Referral Region (HRR), as defined
by- the Dartmouth Atlas for Healthcare, which partitions U.S. zip code areas into 306
distinct regions. Regions are defined by where the majority of the population in each
zip code are referred for tertiary health care services, and are commonly used as the
unit of analysis for cancer care (see e.g Fisher et al., 2003a,b; Onega et a]., 2008). For
some analyses, we also consider Hospital Service Areas (HSA), which partitions zip
codes more finely into 3,436 regions based on where patients in each zip are typically
hospitalized.
To track the adoption and use of the 21 chemotherapy agents, we analyze a 100%
sample of Medicare outpatient claims as well as a 20% sample of Medicare physician
carrier claims. For each provider region, we estimate the fraction of appropriate
patients who receive a given new chemotherapy drug. To do this, we first define
a patient chemotherapy treatment episode to include all chemotherapy claims for a
patient within a given provider region (e.g. HRR) and calendar year. For each patient
episode, we observe any cancers for which the patient received treatment, as well as
the chemotherapy drugs administered to the patient. Our data comprise 3.7 million
chemotherapy care episodes in our main specification, with provider regions defined
as HRRs.
2.2.2 Principal investigator locations
In addition to the Medicare claims data, we also collected a new data set linking
chemotherapy drugs to the clinical trial that provided the primary support for FDA
approval. The data were collected through review of FDA approval history docu-
mentation and the relevant academic medical literature. While each drug application
typically cites several studies from various stages of drug development, the applicant
must pre-specify a "pivotal trial," which is typically a randomized trial that provides
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the most comprehensive evidence to date on the efficacy of the drug.1 By matching
the pivotal trial information in the FDA application to the authors of the academic
article reporting the trial's findings, we are able to identify the researchers who were
primarily responsible for the trial.
In our analysis, we exploit the convenient fact that the first author in medical
journal articles represents the major contributing author (Baerlocher et al., 2007).
In the case of clinical trial reports, the trial's principal investigator (PI) typically
receives the first-author position; hence, for the discussion that follows we will use
the author position to determine the study's PI, and use the terms PI and first author
interchangeably. We categorize authors as "first," "other" and "last," and we record
each author's location based on the zip code of the author's institution at the time
of the article's publishing. Using this location information, provider regions can be
categorized based on their geographic proximity to authors of the clinical trial. In
the discussion that follows, the phrase "PI HRR" refers to the HRR where the PI for
the particular drug under analysis practiced.
2.2.3 Drug Information and Summary Statistics
For this analysis, we identified 21 new chemotherapy drugs that may be covered by
Medicare Part B. Of these drugs, 17 of them had clinical trials led by researchers in
the United States, and thus may be used to identify the impact of proximity to a PI
on drug diffusion. The remaining four drugs are included in the sample to improve
the precision of coefficients on other control variables.
The twenty-one drugs in our study are listed in Table 2-1, sorted by order of their
FDA approval dates. These drugs target a variety of cancer types, including common
carcinomas such as breast, lung, and colon cancer, as well as hematologic and urologic
cancers. All drugs were FDA approved between 1998-2007. A majority of the pivotal
Detailed information on the development and approval process for new drugs can be found on
the FDA's website at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess.
2 We began with a list of 26 new chemotherapy drugs that we obtained from 3acli (2009). Of
these drugs, five of them were billed fewer than 10 times in our sample over the first two years after
approval. Given that we were not able to observe any measurable diffusion for these six agents, they
were excluded from the analysis.
64
clinical trials (13/21) were published in the Journal of Clinical Oncology; the New
England Journal of Medicine was the next most frequent publication venue (4/21).
Table 2-1 column 8 reports the number of observed patient chemotherapy care
episodes for the targeted diagnosis in the two calendar years following FDA approval.
There is substantial heterogeneity in target population size due to variation in disease
prevalence, ranging from 800 observed episodes of the relatively rare cutaneous T-
cell lymphoma to 84,900 episodes of lung cancer. As described below, most regression
results are weighted by the size of the target population to improve precision; however,
note that the regression results are qualitatively similar when each drug is weighted
equally, rather than by target population size.
The first author on these trials practice at a wide set of academic medical centers
that together span all four U.S. census regions. The most frequent first author loca-
tions within our sample are: Houston, Texas, (four trials); Chicago, Illinois, (three
trials); Durham, North Carolina, (two trials); and New York, New York (two trials).
There are 11 unique HRRs that contain a PI for at least one drug, 55 HRRs that
contain a non-lead author for at least one drug (but never contain a PI), and 248
remaining HRRs that never contain any author.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2-2. Over the first two years following
drug approval, the average utilization rate of the new drug for indicated patient
episodes ranges from 16% in regions where the PI practices to 10% in regions that
never contain any investigators.
Among the regions that do not contain any investigators for the observed drug,
those regions that contain PIs for other in-sample drugs are the most intensive
adopters; regions that contain another drug's PI are over 20% more likely to use
a new chemotherapy agent compared to regions that never contain any investigators,
as reported in columns 3 and 5. Thus, PIs tend to be located in regions that have a
high degree of enthusiasm, expertise, or patient demand for new chemotherapy agents
in general.
Within the set of regions that contain a PI for at least one in-sample drug, the
PI HRR has 40% greater utilization rates on average as compared to utilization in
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regions that contain no authors for that particular drug (cf. columns 1 and 3). Thus,
despite the overall higher rates of new drug use in regions that contain a PI for at
least one drug, utilization is even greater when the lead researcher of the particular
observed drug is in the area.
In the third row of Table 2-2, we can observe that regions containing PIs have
more chemotherapy episodes treating the targeted disease than regions with secondary
authors or regions without any authors. However, within the set of regions that
contain a PI for at least one drug, comparing columns 1 and 3, there are slightly
larger observed target populations in those regions that do not contain the PI for
a given drug. This suggests that PIs tend to reside in more populous regions (or
regions with particularly high rates of cancer), but that the drug trials do not appear
to be further targeted to areas with idiosyncratically larger appropriate populations
amongst this set of regions that contain at least one drug's PI.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Our central idea is to exploit variation in the geographic location of lead study au-
thors across multiple new chemotherapy drugs to identify the impact of geographic
proximity to a PI. If the location of study authors were randomly assigned across
the country, then we could simply compare drug utilization across locations and in-
fer that any increased propensity to use the drug was due to the extra experience
or information about the drug that the first author has and may communicate to
others in his geographic region. In the absence of random assignment, we endeavor
to control richly for regional propensities to use new chemotherapy agents and for
changing attitudes about new drugs, in order to isolate the impact of PI location on
drug usage.
Our empirical framework is analogous to a difference-in-differences setting, where
we compare drug utilization in PI and non-PI regions, controlling for baseline dif-
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ferences in the region's propensity to use new chemotherapeutic agents as well as
controlling for time trends in the needs for and desirability of each drug. Since we
observe the diffusion of twenty-one newly introduced drugs, we exploit regions' usage
of other new drugs (for which the area contains no authors) to establish its propensity
to adopt when it does not contain a study author. In addition, we use the time path
of drug usage in non-author regions to establish how the drug usage evolved outside
the PI HRR.
Our baseline regression specification takes the following form:
(drugjtd { HRR x disease-group FEs}ijd + { drug x year FEs}dt
+ Of51(PI HRR)jd + Eijd (2.1)
An observation is a patient-drug episode (patient i treated in provider region j, t
years after drug d was approved), limited to episodes for which drug d is indicated
based on patient diagnoses. The regression is estimated over patient-drug episodes
that fall within three years following FDA approval of the drug.
The first term in the regression above is a vector of fixed effects measuring each
HRR's propensity to use new chemotherapy drugs for each of three cancer disease
types. Targeted diseases are grouped based on the cancer subtype: hematologic
cancers (leukemias and lymphomas), urologic cancers (kidney and bladder cancer),
and other carcinomas (brain, breast, colon, and lung cancer). This allows regions to
differ in their enthusiasm and patient suitability for new chemotherapies treatments
of each disease group. The second term in the regression allows each drug to face an
idiosyncratic yearly shock to its popularity that is constant across regions. Lastly,
the key independent variable of interest is an indicator for whether the first author
of drug d's pivotal clinical trial is located in region j. The coefficient of on this
indicator describes how much more likely a cancer patient will receive a new chemo
drug if treated in the HRR where the PI of the drug's pivotal clinical trial is located.
The primary threat to the validity of this approach would stem from the possibility
that PI egions are systematically more likely to use the new drug (for reasons not
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driven by author status) than their utilization of other new drugs for this cancer
type and the national utilization of this particular new drug would predict. This
could occur if, for example, clinical trials were located in areas with idiosyncratically
high latent demand for that particular drug. We deal with this threat to validity in
a number of ways, outlined in further detail below, including limiting the analysis
to regions that ever contain a first author and controlling for HRR-by-disease fixed
effects with finer groupings of disease types.
In the first set of results discussed below and presented in Section 2.3.2, we match
patients to provider regions on the basis of where patient care is actually delivered.
Thus, it is important to recognize that any effect PI status has on a region's propensity
to prescribe a new chemotherapy agent could be driven by two separate channels: (a)
a partial-equilibrium effect in which providers in the PI region have an increased
propensity to treat a fixed population of patients with the new drug; and (b) a
general equilibrium effect in which patients suitable for particular treatments sort
to providers who specialize in those treatments.3 For example, an increased number
of suitable patients may travel into the PI author region for treatment, or suitable
resident patients may be more likely to stay within the region for their care. (In this
context, patient suitability could encompass both clinical appropriateness and the
patient's demand for a new drug.)
To exemplify this point, suppose fd(O, p) denotes the fraction of cancer patients
treated with drug d in a given region, where p measures the drug's suitability for
patients treated in the region, and 0 indexes the propensity of physicians in the
region to administer the drug to a standard patient. The essential point is that both
O and p may respond to a change in a region's author status r, and thus the aggregate
effect of author status on regional treatment intensity is given by
dfd _ fd dO &fd dp
dr 8O dr p dr
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation measures the effect that PI
3 Note that both channels are present even under true random assignment of principal investigators
to geographic regions.
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status has on a region's propensity to use a drug holding fixed patient suitability,
while the second term measures the increased usage of the drug due to patient sorting.
Our baseline specification (2.1) measures the aggregate impact of first-author status
on drug utilization, but does not disentangle the two mechanisms. Because these
two channels have very different implications for policy, we present in section 2. 1
an instrumental variables approach that isolates the change in utilization driven by
channel (a), i.e. the increased propensity of first author regions to treat any particular
patient.
2.3.2 Baseline Proximity Effects
We begin by presenting evidence on whether geographic proximity to a new chemother-
apy drug's principal investigator impacts a physician's propensity to prescribe that
drug for indicated patients, as estimated by our baseline specification (2.1) described
above. The results from this estimation are reported in Table 2-3. As shown in col-
umn (1), we find that patients with the targeted diagnosis who receive chemotherapy
treatment in the PI's HRR are 3.8 percentage points more likely to receive the new
drug. This result is calculated over the first two years following the year of the drug's
FDA approval. To provide a useful benchmark, this PI impact is a 37% increase over
the 10.3% average utilization rate of these new chemotherapy drugs within regions
that contain a PI for at least one other chemotherapy drug in our sample but do not
contain any author for that particular drug (see Table 2-2, column (3)).
Next we explore the extent to which drug utilization is influenced by geographic
proximity to other authors of a drug's pivotal trial. To do this, we first estimate
a slightly modified version of specification (2.1) in which the indicator for whether
patient care is delivered in the PI's HRR is replaced by an indicator for whether care
is delivered in the HRR of any investigator on the drug's pivotal trial. As reported in
Table 2-3 columns (2) and (4), the average effect that proximity to any investigator
has on drug utilization is substantially smaller at 1.3pp, suggesting that there is
important heterogeneity in the role of proximity to authors based on their level of
contribution to the clinical trial.
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We explore this heterogeneity by re-estimating specifications reported in colurnns
(2) and (4) with the addition of indicators for proximity to first and last authors.
The results, reported in columns 3 and 5, estimate proximity to any author to have
a positive (but not statistically significant) impact of 0.7pp. Proximity to the last
author has a slightly smaller but not significantly different effect. However, the effect
of proximity to the first author is 3.4pp higher than is proximity to any author
(statistically significant at the 1% level). Given that most of the proximity effect
on drug utilization appears to be driven by the first author, we focus the remainder
of our analysis and discussion primarily on proximity to first authors, although we
report any-author specifications as well.
In Table 2-,3, Panel C, we further investigate the impact of proximity to a drug
investigator, here limiting the sample only to the first year following initial FDA ap-
proval of the drug. As we discuss in more detail in the next section below, the impact
of proximity is greatest immediately following drug approval and fades out over the
study period. In column (8), we find that the regions containing any investigator
(who is neither the first nor the last author) are 2.1pp more likely to prescribe the
new chemotherapy drug, significant at the 5% level. This effect is double the mag-
nitude estimated in column (6) when the second event year following FDA approval
is included in the sample. This suggests that there is an initial positive relationship
between new drug utilization and proximity to other study investigators, but that
the effect fades out more quickly than the effect of PI proximity and is significantly
smaller 2-years post FDA approval.
2.3.3 The Evolution of Proximity Effects
An important question we turn to next is how the effect of geographic proximity to a
principal investigator evolves over time. With a Roy model of productivity spillovers,
we may find geographic specialization in the use of medical treatments as described by
Cha'indra anmd Staiger (2007). High-use areas develop expertise in the technology and
have higher returns to its usage, and so they continue to use it more frequently in the
steady state than low-use areas that do not develop a similar expertise. Under this
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model of productivity spillovers, we might expect to find long-run differences in the
use of new chemotherapy agents across PI HRRs and other regions. An alternative
model such as Phelps (2000) where information asymmetries are the reason for delayed
adoption amongst non-PI regions would predict convergence in practice patterns as
information about the new treatments reaches each physician.
To measure the evolution of the PI proximity effect, we estimate a modified version
of specification (2.1) in which the PI HRR indicator is interacted with a full set of
event-year dummies 1(s = t) ranging from 1-4 calendar years following drug approval
(0 corresponds to FDA approval year).' We also flexibly allow each HRR to follow
separate diffusion rates by cancer disease type. The regression equation we estimate
is given by
(drug)ijtd = { HRR x disease-group x event-year FEs}ijd + {drug x year FEs}dt
4
+ E [,l(PI HRR)d1(s = t) + Eijtd (2.2)
S=1 - -
The primary coefficients of interest in equation (2.2) are the #t, which describe
the effect of geographic proximity to drug d's principal investigator on utilization of
that drug t years after FDA approval. A modified version of (2.2) in which the PI
dummy 1(PI HRR)jd is replaced by an indicator for whether any of a, drug's pivotal
trial study authors is located in the HRR estimates the evolution of the average effect
of proximity to any investigator.
Panel A of Figure 2-1 plots how the estimated effect of proximity to a drug's
principal investigator on drug utilization evolves over time, while Panel B plots the
analogous result with proximity measured with respect to any of the drug's pivotal
clinical trial authors. The time pattern of proximity effects traced out in these graphs
reveals a number of insights. First, recently approved cancer drugs are used much
more intensively in regions a study investigator, an effect even stronger in the PI's
region. These patterns correspond to the results in Table 2-3 discussed previously.
4Medicare drug codes are not introduced until the calendar year following FDA approval for the
large majority of drugs in our sample, limiting our ability to measure diffusion prior to the first
calendar year.
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The second pattern highlighted by Figure 2-1 is that the proximity effect fades over
time, though it is roughly twice as persistent in the PI's region compared with the
average investigator region. In both cases, any proximity effect on drug utilization
vanishes within 4 years after drug approval.
Taken as a whole, these estimates suggest that proximity to a pioneer investigator
drives more-intensive take-up of new drugs, an effect which is stronger and more
persistent for principal investigators than for other early investigators of the drug.
Yet despite the initial eagerness to use the drug, this difference in intensity between
investigator and non-investigator regions converges within a few years.
2.3.4 Geographic Extent of Investigator Influence
What we have documented so far is that patients treated in regions (HRRs) that
contain pioneer investigators of a new cancer drug are significantly more likely to
receive that new drug than are patients treated in other regions. While this implies
that geography plays an important role in the adoption of new drugs, it does not
address the extent of geographic influence. On the one hand, the effects of proximity
to a drug's investigator may extend beyond the HRR in which that investigator is
located to neighboring HRRs as well, or perhaps even further. On the other hand, the
HRR may be too broad, for example if influence only extended to doctors within the
investigator's hospital or physician's group. In the extreme, all geographic influence
could be driven by investigators themselves being more likely to use the drug, with
no effect on other physicians in the area.
In the remainder of this section, we explore the geographic extent of investigator
influence on regional propensities to use new drugs.
Effect beyond investigator direct effect
As noted above, the evidence on geographic proximity we have presented so far leaves
open the possibility that the increased use of a new drug in an investigator's HRR
is entirely due to that investigator's propensity to use the drug. For example, if the
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principal investigator of a colon cancer drug treats 4% of colon cancer patients in his
or her region and treats all of them with the new drug while other physicians use the
drug at the national rate, this would lead to a nearly 4 percentage point increase in
that region's use of the drug.
To evaluate whether the increase in drug use in the principal investigator's region
is driven by other physicians practicing in that region, we simply re-estimate specifi-
cation (2.1) after dropping out patients who are treated by the principal investigators
themselves. If cancer patients uniquely matched to a single oncologist, this exercise
would be straightforward. However, cancer patients are often treated by teams of
physicians, making it difficult to disentangle the impact any one of the physicians
played in the patient's treatment. Our approach is conservative in that it drops
out patients episodes in which the principal investigator ever administered cancer
care, even if a different physician delivered the new chemotherapy drug. Thus, this
approach will not pick up proximity effects channeled through the influence the in-
vestigator may exert on other physicians while they are working together on the same
patient, providing a lower-bound of the full proximity effect on nearby physicians.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 2-4, column (2). Roughly 1,000
patient episodes receiving treatment from principal investigators of the drugs in our
sample are dropped from the baseline specification (repeated in the table's first col-
umn for reference). Despite this restriction, the estimated proximity effect drops only
very slightly (and insignificantly) from 3.9 to 3.6 percentage points, indicating that
the proximity effect measured in the baseline specification is not a direct effect of
the PI's own treatment choices but rather impacts the choices of physicians in the
broader community.
Effect on neighbors
We next test the geographic extent of investigator influence. We do this for two pri-
mary reasons. First, it sheds light on the degree of "friction" in the geographic net-
work through which investigator influence operates, which in turn can help distinguish
between potential mechanisms. Second, understanding the breadth of influence also
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impacts the interpretation of our baseline estimates from specification (2.1). There,
we estimated the wedge between investigator HRRs relative to non-investigator HRRs.
But if proximity effects extend more broadly than an investigator's own HRR, some of
the comparison non-investigator regions are themselves influenced by the treatment,
resulting in proximity effects that are too small. On the other hand, if the HRR is
broader than the extent of geographic influence, the estimated proximity effects will
also be too small, as they it averages the effect over both treated and non-treated
regions.
In principle, if oncologists were sufficiently dispersed geographically, it would be
feasible to non-parametrically identify precisely how the influence of proximity to an
investigator changes as distance from the investigator grows. However, cancer care
in the U.S. is highly specialized and major cancer care sites are often geographically
dispersed (Onega et al. 2008). To the extent that cancer care is primarily delivered
in distinct geographic clusters, testing the extent of investigator influence amounts
to testing how intensity across cancer care sites varies based on distance to the in-
vestigator's site. If influence is confined to the investigator's site, then even adjacent
regions will show no increased use of the new drug.
To measure whether investigator influence extends beyond an investigator's region,
for each drug we identify the "neighbor" HRRs that lie geographically adjacent to
the HRR in which the drug's principal investigator is located. We then measure
the degree to which investigator regions and their neighbors increase drug utilization
relative to non-neighbor regions, by estimating
(drugijtd { HRR x disease-group FEs}id + {drug x year FEs}dt
+ Of51(PI HRR)d + / 1(neighbor HRR)d + etd (2.3)
Table 2-4 shows in column (3) that while PI HRRs have a 3.9 pp increase in their
propensity to use the new drug, there is no observed increase in propensity in neigh-
boring HRRs. The point estimate suggests a 0.1 pp increase in new drug utilization in
neighboring HRR.s, which is small in magnitude and statistically not distinguishable
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from zero. When investigator regions and their neighbor regions are defined based
on the presence of any author on the drug's pivotal trial, the results are qualitatively
the same (column 6). Based on these estimates, we find no influence of investigators
extending beyond the investigators' own HRRs.
To shed further light on the geographic extent of investigator influence, we con-
sider using Hospital Service Areas as an alternative and finer definition of provider
geography than HRRs. We then estimate the analogous version of specification (2.3)
where all variables and patient episodes are redefined at the HSA level rather than at
the HRR. As shown in columns (4) and (7), the results are qualitatively very similar
to the HRR-level neighbor specification with all proximity effects concentrated in the
regions containing the investigators. These results indicate that while drug investi-
gators exert a strong influence on the propensity for nearby physicians to adopt and
utilize those drugs, this influence is highly concentrated geographically.
One potential explanation for this strong geographic concentration of the prox-
imity effects is that approximately 80% of observed chemotherapy care in the PI's
HRR also occurs within the PI's HSA. Because cancer care is highly concentrated at
major tertiary care centers, and PI's typically practice at large academic hospitals,
relatively few patients in our sample seek treatment at the smaller hospitals within
the PI's HRR but outside his HSA. If patients who may be appropriate for treatment
with the new chemotherapy drug would tend to be referred to the large tertiary care
center within their HRR, then patient sorting may drive the estimated coefficient on
neighboring HSA's drug adoption towards zero.
2.3.5 Drug-Specific Investigator Influence
While our evidence above measures the average influence investigators exert on nearby
physicians' drug adoption rates, the degree of this influence may vary across drugs, for
example due to differences in the degree of the investigator's "connectedness" in the
local community or the level of enthusiasm for the new drug based on trial results.
This section seeks to flesh out this heterogeneity, by measuring how investigator
influence varies over the drugs in our sample.
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To do this, we estimate our baseline specification (2.1), with the modification that
the investigator region dummy is fully interacted with a set of K indicators for each
drug with a U.S. investigator. This new specification is given by
(drug)ijtd = { HRR x disease-group FEs}id +f{drug x year FEs}dt
+ E #a1 (PI HR R)jd1(drug d = k)] + Eijtd (2.4)
k=1-
The coefficient of interest 3d describes how much more (or less) intensively drug d was
used in the principal investigator's region relative to other regions, after controlling
for each region's typical adoption rate for similar new drugs.
The results of this regression are plotted in Figure 2-2 with the drugs sorted in
increasing order of #d. For reference, the figure also plots the mean use of each drug
among the HRRs that contain a principal investigator for any drug in our sample.
As the figure shows, there is significant heterogeneity in the proximity effect across
drugs. Two drugs in the sample show statistically negative proximity effects, while 7
are statistically positive.
To break these results down even further, we calculate the (residualized) utilization
rates of each of these drugs across the 11 HRRs that contain a PI for any drug in our
sample (controlling for the fixed effects in (2.1)). The results are shown in Fige 2-3.
Note that Figure 2-2 derives from the results in Figure 2-3 by taking, for each drug,
the (regression-weighted) average difference between the drug utilization rate in the
PI region and the average utilization of that drug across the non-PI regions. By
exposing the data, Figuire 2-3 shows not only the variation in utilization of each new
drugs across regions, but also shows the PI region's usage rank relative to the control
regions. In fact, the PI region is the most intensive region for 5 (30%) of the 17 drugs
in this sample, and is ranked in the top half for all but 3 of the drugs.
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2.4 Patient Sorting and IV Estimates
As discussed above, there are two possible mechanisms for the observed increased
propensity to prescribe new drugs in PI regions: an increased propensity to use the
drug on a fixed set of patients, and a change in patient sorting such that the PI
regions see patients with higher latent demand. In this section, we test for changes
in patient sorting, and then use an instrumental variables strategy to identify the
differences in drug utilization that occur holding the set of patients fixed.
In Table 2-5, we test whether patients with the targeted diagnosis who seek treat-
ment in the PI's HRR are more likely to have traveled from a different HRR of
residence. This would occur if, for example, savvy patients travel into the PI's HRR
for treatment in order to gain access to the new chemotherapy. drugs. In columns
(1) through (4), the regression specification mirrors that in the main specification
described in equation (2.]1) above, but the outcome variable has been replaced with
an indicator variable for whether the patient has traveled in from a different HRR.
In the baseline specification, including all observations and testing for travel to
the PI's HRR, we find a positive point estimate suggestive of increased travel, but the
effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Once we narrow the sample to the
set of HRR's that ever contain a PI for any new drug, the estimated effect increases
and becomes statistically significant at the 5% level. In particular, we find that 4 pp
more of the patients treated in the PI's HRR have traveled from an outside HRR,
as reported in column (2). In columns (3) and (4), we investigate the propensity to
travel into a region containing any study author and continue to find an increased
proportion of traveling patients, with approximately 3 pp more patients traveling
from outside the HRR in author regions, as compared to non-investigator regions,
significant at the 1% level.
This evidence suggests that some patients are aware of new centers of expertise
for the new chemotherapy agent and are willing to travel further to improve their
access to the drug. If these patients who are newly traveling into the PI's HRR are
either more clinically appropriate for the new drug or have higher demand for trying
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the new technology, then part of the increased levels of drug utilization may be driven
by the changing patient composition.
In Table 2-5, columns (6) and (8), we test whether the patients who travel from
outside HRRs differ in their propensity to receive the new drug. In these columns,
we report results from a regression that again mirrors equation (2.1), maintaining
new drug utilization as the outcome variable of interest, but adding interactions with
whether the patient has traveled from outside the HRR to every term in the regression.
The regression takes the following form:
(drug)ijtd { HRR x disease-group x traveler FEs}2 id + {drug x year x traveler FEs}dt
+ /f1(PI HRR)jd + Oftl(PI HRR*traveler )ijd + Eit (2.5)
where traveler is a binary indicator for whether the observed patient is seeking care
outside his home HRR.
We find that patients traveling to the PI's HRR are indeed more likely to receive
treatm ent with the new drug than patients treated in the PI HRR who also reside
within that HRR. These traveling patients are 2.6pp more likely to receive the new
treatment, significant at the 5% level. Together, the findings in this table suggest
that not only are more patients with the targeted diagnosis traveling into the PI's
region to seek out the new treatment, but that these patients are indeed more likely to
receive treatment than those who were already residing in the region. This evidence
suggests strongly that the overall 3.9 pp higher new drug use in PI regions is driven
at least in part by changing patient composition, and not solely a higher propensity
to use the drug on a fixed set of patients.
To isolate whether the PI regions are indeed more likely than other regions to use
the drug on any given patient, we pursue an instrumental variables (IV) strategy.
In particular, we use each patient's HRR of residence as an instrumental variable
to predict whether they will seek treatment in an HRR that contains the PI for the
relevant drug. This instrument mitigates the concern that patient sorting renders the
patients treated in the PI region more suitable to the new chemotherapy treatment.
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The exclusion restriction requires that, after conditioning on the included fixed effects,
where a patient lives is uncorrelated with his suitability or demand for treatment with
the new chemotherapy drug.
The first stage equation of the IV model takes this form:
(treated in author HRR)ijtd {HRR x disease-group FEs}ijd + {drug x year FEs}dt
+7 y11(residence in PI HRR)ijd + Eijtd (2.6)
The reduced form follows:
(drug)jtd = {HRR x disease-group FEs}ijd + {drug x year FEs}dt
+ 721(residence in PI HRR)jd + Eijtd (2.7)
The IV estimate is the simple ratio of 72/7Y1. Note that paralleling the baseline
regression specification, we include fixed effects for HRR by disease group and for
drug by year. We also report results from an enriched IV specification where in
addition to using residence in the PI HRR as an instrument, we also include two
additional instruments: (1) residence in a neighboring HRR (i.e. a region that shares
a border with the PI HRR); and (2) residence in a neighbor-of-a-neighbor HRR (i.e.
a region that is separated from the PI HRR by one neighbor).
The exclusion restriction could be violated under a few conditions. One possibility
is that patients with the targeted cancer who reside in the PI region could have
idiosyncratically high demand for the drug; this could occur if, for example, the drug
targets a particular sub-type of colon cancer that has a higher-than-typical prevalence
in the PI's region, so that a larger fraction of colon cancer patients in the region are
appropriate for treatment. Second, the instrument would be invalid if patients change
their HRR of residence in response to the availability of new chemotherapy drugs.
Under the IV framework, the exclusion restriction is not directly testable, but it
seems plausible that the fraction of targeted cancer patients suitable for treatment
with the new drug would not vary systematically across regions and that elderly
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Medicare patients would be very unlikely to move across regions within a three-year
period in response to the location of a new chemotherapy trial.
Results from the IV regressions are reported in Table 2-6. Column 1, row 1,
reports that patients who live in the PI's HRR are nearly 80 pp more likely than
non-resident patients to receive treatment within the PI HRR, indicating a strong
correlation between the instrumental variable and the endogenous regressor in the
first stage. The reduced form results find that patients residing in the PI's HRR are
2 percentage points more likely to receive treatment with the new drug. The Wald
estimate reported in the final row of results rescales the reduced form estimate and
estimates that providers in the PI's region are 2.8 pp more likely to prescribe the
new drug compared to other providers, significant at the 5% level. The finding is
robust to restricting the sample only to patients residing in HRRs that contain a PI
for any drug, as reported in Column 2. Adding the additional instrumental variables
for residence in neighbor HRRs to the model also does not substantially change the
estimated IV coefficient.
The results are similar in the specification investigating the impact of being treated
in a region with any study author, but the magnitude of the reduced form and two-
stage-least-squares estimates are markedly smaller and less statistically significant.
Overall, the results suggest a 1 percentage point increase in a targeted patient's
propensity to receive the new drug when being treated in an author's region, signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
The IV results suggest that physicians in the PI's region of residence are approx-
imately 2.8 pp more likely to use the new drug on a fixed set of patients, which is
a somewhat smaller effect than the baseline regression results reporting a 3.9 pp in-
crease in drug utilization across all patients treated in the PI region. Suitable patients
sorting into the region may have contributed to the high observed point estimate in
the baseline regression, but the result remains large and statistically significant in the
IV specification.
Taken together, the patient traveling results and the IV regressions find strong
support for both hypothesized channels by which the presence of a PI may affect
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care in his region. Patients with high latent demand for the drug seem to seek
out care in areas with expertise in the new technology. In addition, doctors in the
PI's region are more likely to use the new drug, holding fixed the population of
patients seeking treatment. The two results work in tandem, since if PI regions had
no greater expertise with a new drug, it would be surprising to find increasing numbers
of appropriate patients undertaking costly travel to seek treatment in the region.
2.5 Conclusion
The results presented above suggest a significant role for informational frictions af-
fecting the adoption of new chemotherapy agents in the first few years after drug
introduction. Regions that contained a new drug's PI were 2.8 percentage points
more likely to prescribe the new drug in the preferred IV specification presented in
Table 2-6. This effect is primarily driven by physicians practicing within the same
health service area as the PI, i.e. doctors who are in regular contact with the area's
large tertiary care center, but it is not driven by the prescribing patterns of the PI
himself. Patients outside the PI's HRR are increasingly likely to travel into the PI's
region from a different HRR of residence to seek care after the new drug is intro-
duced, suggesting that some patients are aware of the differences in drug adoption or
expertise across regions and willing to endure greater travel costs to gain access to
the new treatment.
Despite these marked differences in early adoption of new chemotherapy drugs,
there is no evidence that early expertise with a drug drives higher rates of long-term
utilization. PI HRRs are no more likely to specialize in treatment with the new
drug than other regions by the fourth year following drug introduction. Thus, the
information frictions that may hamper early adoption seem to ease over time and
the utilization of PI and other HRRs converges within a four-year period. However,
even if there are no observed long-run differences in utilization of the studied drugs,
research tends to cluster at particular prestigious academic hospitals. Although long-
run prescription patterns for any particular drug may converge across regions, overall
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treatment patterns for cancer patients may persistently differ as the research-intense
regions continue to house investigators for each wave of new treatment innovations.
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Figure 2-1: Influence of Author Proximity on Drug Use
Panel A: Principal Investigator
LC)
2 3
t = years since FDA approval
Panel B: Any author
2 3
t = years since FDA approval
Notes: Graphs plot estimates of the effect pioneer investigator proximity has on drug utilization,
t years since the corresponding chemotherapy drug became FDA approved. Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals constructed from standard errors clustered at the provider HRR-drug level.
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Figure 2-2: Principal Investigator Influence on Drug Utilization, by Drug
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Notes: Red bars plot estimates of the principal investigator proximity effect on drug utilization, by
drug. Blue bars plot fraction of indicated patients receiving drug within 2 years of FDA approval.
Bars on the proximity effects indicate 95% confidence intervals constructed from standard errors
clustered at the provider HRR-drug level. All estimates calculated using patient episodes occurring
in HRRs that ever contain a principal investigator for a drug in our sample.
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Figure 2-3: Distribution of Drug Utilization across PI HRRs, by Drug
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Notes: Each observation in the plot represents the average drug use (after adjusting for drug-
eventyear and HRR-cancertype fixed effects) over indicated patients within an HRR, limited to
HRRs that ever contain a principal investigator for any drug in the sample.
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Table 2-1: List of studied chemotherapy drugs
Generic drug name Trade FDA approval Target disease 1st author city Year of pivotal Journal of pivotal trial Size of target No. of authors
name date trial publication population on pivotal trial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Capecitabine Xeloda 4/30/1998 breast cancer Dallas, TX 1999 Journal of Clinical Oncology 26,410 10
Trastuzumab Herceptin 9/25/1998 breast cancer Chicago, IL 1999 Journal of Clinical Oncology 26,410 11
Valrubicin Valstar 9/25/1998 bladder cancer Chicago, IL 2000 Journal of Urology 13,557 6
Denileukin diftitox Ontak 2/5/1999 cutaneous T-cell lymphoma Durham, NC 2001 Journal of Clinical Oncology 819 26
Temozolomide Temodar 8/11/1999 brain cancer Houston, TX 2000 British Journal of Cancer 1,797 22
Epirubicin hydrochloride Ellence 9/15/1999 breast cancer Canada 1998 Journal of Clinical Oncology 53,762 18
Gemtuzumab ozogarnicin Mylotarg 5/17/2000 acute myeloid leukemia Seattle, WA 2001 Journal of Clinical Oncology 2,192 17
Arsenic trioxide Trisenox 9/25/2000 acute myeloid leukemia New York, NY 2001 Journal of Clinical Oncology 1,079 15
Alemtuzumab Campath 5/7/2001 chronic lymphocytic leukemia Houston, TX 2002 Blood 12,027 11
Zoledronic acid Zometa 8/20/2001 hypercalcemia of malignancy Canada 2001 Journal of Clinical Oncology 2,694 11
lbritumomab tiuxetan Zevalin 2/19/2002 non-Hodgkin's lymphoma Rochester, MN 2002 Journal of Clinical Oncology 51,042 13
Fulvestrant Faslodex 4/25/2002 breast cancer Houston, TX 2002 Journal of Clinical Oncology 64,045 14
Oxaliplatin Eloxatin 8/9/2002 colon cancer Nashville, TN 2003 Journal of Clinical Oncology 52,778 8
Bortezomib' Velcade 5/13/2003 multiple myeloma Boston, MA 2003 New England Journal of Medicine 23,819 21
Tositumomab-l 131 Bexxar 6/27/2003 non-Hodgkin's lymphoma Stanford, CA 2005 Journal of Clinical Oncology 54,275 7
Pemetrexed Alirnta 2/4/2004 lung cancer Chicago, IL 2003 Journal of Clinical Oncology 84,918 13
Cetuximab Erbitux 2/12/2004 colon cancer United Kingdom 2004 New England Journal of Medicine 55,528 12
Bevacizumab Avastin 2/26/2004 colon cancer Durham, NC 2004 New England Journal of Medicine 55,528 15
Decitabine Dacogen 5/2/2006 myelodysplastic syndromes Houston, TX 2006 Cancer 15,460 16
Panitumumab Arranon 9/27/2006 colon cancer Belgium 2007 Journal of Clinical Oncology 59,028 12
Temsirolimus Torisel 5/30/2007 kidney cancer Philadelphia, PA 2007 New England Journal of Medicine 3,794 19
There were two pivotal trials for lbritumorna b tiuxetan; the second trial had 1 total authors, with the same first author also in Rochester, MN, and was also published in the Journal of Clinical Oncology.
2There were two pivotal trials for Bortezomib; the second trial had a 15 total authors, with the first author in New York, NY, and was published in the British Medical Journal 2004.
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Table 2-2: Drug use summary stastics
Non-PI PI HRR for another Non-PI investigator HRR for HRR with no pivotal
PI HRR for investigator HRR drug, no investigator another drug, no investigators for any
observed drug for abs. drug for observed drug investigator for obs. drug drug in sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables:
Drug utilization rate 0.156 0.098 0.117 0.100 0.096
No. of patient-year-HRR-d rug obs. 6,988 28,359 52,206 130,663 271,734
Avg. no. of patients per HRR-drug pair 388 229 424 183 69
No. of HRR-drug pairs 18 124 123 713 3923
No. of unique HRRs 11 55 11 58 248
Notes: Each column represents mutually exclusive sets of observations. Also, to maintain the same set of drugs represented in each column, drug observations
with non-US based pivotal trials are exiuded.
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Table 2-3: Author Proximity Effect on Drug Utilization
Dependent variable: (drug)_id in (0,1}, indicates receipt of new cancer drug d by patient I
Panel A: All HRRs Panel B: Author HRRs only Panel C: All HRRs, 1st event year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)(PI in HRR) 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.035**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
(any author in HRR) 0.014*** 0.009 0.014*** 0.009 0.022*** 0.021**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
(last author in HRR) -0.007 -0.008 
-0.025*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
drug-eventyr FEs X X X X X X X X X
HRR-cancer FEs X X X X X X X X X
N 660,962 660,962 660,962 96,577 293,128 293,128 289,775 289,775 289,775
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode (patient episodes may indicate multiple drugs). Author HRRs based on location of
authors of each drug's pivotal clinical trial on which initial FDA approval was based. HRR-cancer fixed effects defined using three
categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, and other (including breast, colon, lung, and brain). Standard errors clustered at the
HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
(1-3) All HRRs and patient episodes within 1-2 calendar years after drug's FDA approval
(4) Sample limited to HRRs which ever contain a Principal Investigator (PI)
(5-6) Sample limited to HRRs which ever contain any pivotal trial author
(7-9) All HRRs and patient episodes within the calendar year immediately following drug's FDA approval
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Table 2-4: Geographic Extent of Investigator Influence
Dependent variable: (drug)_id in (0,11, indicates receipt of new cancer drug d by patient i
(1)
(PI in HRR/HSA) 0.039***
(0.013)
(P1 neighbor)
(any author in HRR/HSA)
(any author neighbor)
provider region definition
drug-eventyr FEs
region-cancer FEs
X
X
Principal Investigator (PI)
(2) (3)
0.036*** 0.039***
(0.013) (0.013)
0.001
(0.006)
(4)
0.044***
(0.016)
0.007
(0.011)
HRR HRR HRR HSA
X
X
X
X
X
X
Any Author
(5) (6)
0.014*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
-0.001
(0.003)
HRR HRR HSA
X
X
X
X
N 660,962 659,971 660,962 678,671 660,962 660,962 678,671
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode (patient episodes may indicate multiple drugs). Author HRR/HSAs based
on location of authors of each drug's pivotal clinical trial on which initial FDA approval was based. HRR/HSA-cancer fixed
effects defined using three categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, and other (including breast, colon, lung, and
brain). Standard errors clustered at the HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
(1) From Table 3, column (1), for comparison.
(2) Patients ever treated by a Principal Investigator (of any pivotal trial for drugs in sample) excluded from estimation.
(3) Specification adds indicator for "neighbor" HRRs located geographically adjacent to the HRR in which the PI is located.
(4) Specification adds indicator for "neighbor" HSAs located geographically adjacent to the HAS in which the PI is located.
(5) From Table 3, column (2), for comparison.
(6) Specification adds indicator for "neighbor" HRRs located geographically adjacent to an HRR containing any study author.
(7) Specification adds indicator for "neighbor" HSAs located geographically adjacent to an HSA containing any study author.
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(7)
0.020***
(0.007)
0.002
(0.005)
X
X
Table 2-5: Patient Travel and Proximity Effects
Dependent variables
(1-2): (travel)_id in (0,1}, indicates treatment outside patient i's HRR of residence
(3-8): (drug)_id in {0,1}, indicates receipt of new cancer drug d by patient i
Travel
(1)
(PI in HRR) 0.026
(0.019)
(PI HRR)*traveler
(any author in HRR)
(2)
0.041**
(0.016)
(3) (4) (5)
0.039***
(0.013)
0.032*** 0.032***
(0.009) (0.009)
(any auth HRR)*traveler
HRR definition provider provider provider provider
Drug Utilization
(6) (7)
0.030**
(0.012)
0.026**
(0.010)
(8)
0.014*** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005)
0.011
(0.007)
provider provider provider provider
drug-eventyr FEs
drug-eventyr-traveler FEs
HRR-cancer FEs
HRR-cancer-traveler FEs
X X X X
N 660,962 96,577 660,962 293,128 660,962 660,962 660,962 660,962
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode (patient episodes may indicate multiple drugs). Author HRRs based on
location of authors of each drug's pivotal clinical trial on which initial FDA approval was based. HRR-cancer fixed effects
defined using three categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, and other (including breast, colon, lung, and brain).
Standard errors clustered at the HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
(1-4) Dependent variable indicates whether patient received care outside the patient's HRR of residence.
(2,4) Same as (1,3), except estimated over author HRRs only.
(5,7) From Table 3, columns (1,2), for comparison.
(6,8) Estimates the differential proximity effect for travelers, defined as patients residing outside provider HRR.
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Table 2-6: IV Estimates of Proximity Effect on Drug Utilization
first stage: treated in author HRR effect
residence in author HRR
residence in author neighbor HRR
residence in neighbor of neighbor HRR
reduced form: drug receipt effect
residence in author HRR
residence in author neighbor HRR
residence in neighbor of neighbor HRR
Wold/2SLS
provider in author HRR
Principal Investigator (PI) Any Author
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.796*** 0.876***
(0.034) (0.033)
0.806***
(0.005)
0.131***
(0.003)
0.030***
(0.001)
0.022** 0.022** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
0.013*
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.739*** 0.828***
(0.002) (0.020)
(6)
0.760***
(0.002)
0.103***
(0.001)
0.016***
(0.001)
0.007* 0.009** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.028** 0.025** 0.031*** 0.010* 0.011** 0.010*
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
drug-eventyr FEs
provider HRR-cancer FEs
Sample
residence in any HRR
residence in an author HRR
X X X
X X X
X X
X
N 660,359 76,100 660,359
X X X
X X X
X X
X
660,359 267,287 660,359
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode (patient episodes may indicate multiple drugs). Author HRRs based on
location of authors of each drug's pivotal clinical trial on which initial FDA approval was based. HRR-cancer fixed effects
defined using three categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, and other (including breast, colon, lung, and brain).
Standard errors clustered at the HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 2-7: Author Proximity Effect on Drug Utilization for Indicated/All Cancer
Patients
Dependent variable: (drug)_id in {0,1), indicates receipt of new cancer drug d by patient i
Indicated Patients All Cancer Patients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1st author in HRR) 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.0025** 0.0035***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.0012) (0.013)
(any author in HRR) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.0007 0.0008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
drug-eventyr FEs X X X X X X X X
HRR-cancer FEs X X X X X X X X
N 660,962 96,577 660,962 293,128 13,672,002 1,944,314 13,672,002 5,992,456
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode. Columns (1-4) include only drug-episodes recording a diagnosis for the drug's initial
indication. Columns (5-8) include all drug-episodes, regardless of whether the patient was diagnosed with the drug's initial indication.
Author HRRs based on location of authors of each drug's pivotal clinical trial on which initial FDA approval was based. HRR-cancer fixed
effects defined using three categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, and other (including breast, colon, lung, and brain). Standard
errors clustered at the HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
(1) From Table 3, column (1). All indicated patient episodes, all HRRs.
(2) From Table 3, column (4). All indicated patient episodes, limited to HRRs ever containing a first author.
(3) From Table 3, column (2). All indicated patient episodes, all HRRs.
(4) From Table 3, column (5). All indicated patient episodes, limited to HRRs ever containing any author.
(5) All patient episodes (indicated and non-indicated), all HRRs.
(6) All patient episodes (indicated and non-indicated), limited to HRRs ever containing a first author.
(7) All patient episodes (indicated and non-indicated), all HRRs.
(8) All patient episodes (indicated and non-indicated), limited to HRRs ever containing any author.
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Table 2-8: Proximity Effect Robustness to Cancer Type Categories
Dependent variable: (drug)_id in {0,1}, indicates receipt of new cancer drug d by patient i
Principal Investigator (P1) Any Author
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(PI in HRR/HSA) 0.039*** 0.026*** 0.024**
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
(any author in HRR/HSA) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
drug-eventyr FEs X X X X X X
HRR-cancer (3 classes) FEs X X X X
HRR-cancer (7 classes) FEs X X
N 660,962 571,553 660,962 660,962 571,553 660,962
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode. Author HRRs based on location of authors of each drug's pivotal
clinical trial on which initial FDA approval was based. Three categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, and
other (including breast, colon, lung, and brain). Seven categories of cancer drugs: urologic, hematologic, breast,
colon, lung, brain, and hypercalcemia; the lung, brain, and hypercalcemia categories contain only one drug per class.
Standard errors clustered at the HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
(1,3) From Table 3, columns (1,2), for comparison.
(2,5) Drug categories with only one drug (lung, brain, and hypercalcemia) excluded.
(3,6) HRR-cancer fixed effects defined using seven categories of cancer-related drugs.
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Chapter 3
Technology Adoption under
Uncertainty: Off-label Prescribing
in Cancer Care*
3.1 Introduction
Learning how to use health care technologies is fundamental to medical progress.
As highlighted by Arrow (1963), significant uncertainty surrounds the efficacy and
appropriate use of new health technologies, such as how intensively to use a technology
on a given patient (e.g. partial vs. radical surgery, drug dosage levels) or how to
determine which types of patients benefit from a technology (e.g. at what age to
begin screening for certain cancers). With the dramatic growth in costs and health
benefits that U.S. health care has experienced over the past sixty years attributed in
large part to the spread of new medical technologies, providing appropriate patient
care in the midst of uncertainty forms a central challenge facing medical providers,
payers, and policy makers.
In principle, appropriate use of medical technologies can be evaluated using the
*This chapter is co-authored with Leila Agha. We would like to thank Amitabh Chandra, Joseph
Doyle, Amy Finkelstein, and Jonathan Gruber, as well as seminar participants at MIT for helpful
comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the National Institute on Aging, grant
number T32-AG000186.
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"gold standard" of a randomized clinical trial. In the debate over health care financ-
ing, a number of payment reform proposals have focused on evidence-based reim-
bursement policies that limit coverage to applications supported by clinical studies.
In practice, however, there are a number of central challenges to this ideal, including
high costs associated with funding clinical trial research, the duration of trials such
as those evaluating mortality and long-term side effects, and ethical concerns.
Even when these challenges can be overcome, there are many settings where ran-
domized testing between all possible treatment options is simply infeasible due to
the sheer number of possible therapies or treatment combinations. For example, the
FDA has approved 33 different drugs that can be used in the treatment of HIV in-
fection, and clinical trials have found "cocktails" combining multiple drugs that are
more effective than single drugs. Given that the ideal cocktail requires combining
the appropriate set of drugs (which may vary by patient type) as well as setting the
dosage and administration frequency of each drug in the combination, the number of
possible treatment options is virtually infinite. In such settings, physicians may rely
on their understanding of disease and drug mechanisms when determining patient
treatment regimens.
Despite the limited efficacy and safety information surrounding many potential
applications of new health technologies, relatively little is known about what drives
physicians to treat patients when formal evidence on efficacy is limited or unavailable.
To shed light on this issue, we explore how physicians use new drugs in the treatment
of cancer, a setting well-known for a high degree of uncertainty and, in many cases,
a large and complex set of possible treatment options. In particular, we focus on
the decision to treat patients off-label, a practice referring to the administration of
drugs to patient populations that have not been indicated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). While the FDA regulates the set of drugs which may be
prescribed by physicians and specifies a set of approved usages for each drug, the
agency does not exert regulatory control over the practice of medicine itself, allowing
physicians to legally prescribe drugs off-label. Essentially, we use off-label prescribing
of new drugs as a marker for clinical use of those drugs in areas where formal evidence
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on the efficacy is largely uncertain.
For constructing public policy and evaluating social welfare, it would be ideal to
identify factors that drive physicians to experiment with new drugs, and to identify
which of those factors lead to more appropriate treatments and health gains for pa-
tients. As a first step toward this goal, we investigate on three aspects of new drug
use. First, we estimate the extent of off-label usage of new cancer drugs, and char-
acterize the regions that engage in early off-label exploration. Second, we explore
whether factors that boost on-label usage of new drugs also drive physicians to use
those same drugs more intensively off-label. Here we focus on the role of geographic
proximity to pioneer physicians who participated in the pivotal drug trials that lead
to initial FDA approval, a factor which our previous research has shown to increase
on-label utilization (see chapter 2 of this dissertation). Third, we explore whether
physicians increase their drug use in categories where the FDA expands approval to
additional indications.
Our analysis focuses on the prescribing patterns of 20 new cancer drugs within
the Medicare population over the period 1998-2008. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to measure off-label cancer drug usage across a broad sample
of drugs within a large, national subset of the U.S. population. Our analysis of the
extent of off-label prescribing of new cancer drugs yields three main results. First,
we find the degree of off-label prescribing to be high: on average, the drugs in our
sample were prescribed for an off-label cancer 22% of the time, a rate similar to off-
label frequencies observed in non-cancer settings (Radley., Finkelseir, and Stafford,
2006). Second, we find evidence that regions with more oncologists per capita or
the presence of an NCI-designated Comprehensive Cancer Center prescribe a higher
fraction of new drugs off-label, but the gap is modest. Third, while off-label cancer
drugs are often considered a high-cost treatment option such as for patients near the
end of life whose cancer has not responded to other therapies, we observe no difference
in off-label prescribing between regions with high and low overall Medicare spending.
Next, we test the roles first of geographic proximity to pioneer physicians and
second of FDA label expansions on prescribing patterns. As in AaIi ad Nolitor
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(2012), we find that regions which contain the principal investigator (PI) of a drug's
pivotal clinical trial are significantly more likely to use the drug on-label. However,
we find no evidence of increased off-label use in those regions, suggesting that infor-
mation or enthusiasm generated by proximity to a PI remains relatively local to the
study population. Finally, when we examine expansions to the FDA approved drug
indications, we find they are associated with large, significant increases in drug use,
suggesting that physicians respond strongly to the labeling changes and supporting
research. The responsiveness of patient treatment to label changes suggests that FDA
approvals may provide a useful policy instrument for directing the adoption and use
of uncertain medical technologies.
Conceptually, this paper is related to a long literature in economics and so-
ciology on the diffusion of innovations. It is by now well-understood that even
small differences in the rate of technology adoption across regions can explain large
differences in productivity (Parente and Prescott, 1994; Skinner and Staiger, 2009;
Com Hin lm Hobijni, 2010). While the diffusion literature has traditionally focused on
the extensive margin of take-up (e.g. ColeImian, IKz an]1 Mfenzel , 1957; Griliches,
1957; Gort nd Kepper, 1982), recent work by Coin and Nestieri (2010) suggests
that the intensive margin of adoption may play an even more important role in driv-
ing productivity. Understanding this intensive margin within health care is a pri-
mary focus of this paper. This paper also ties into the broad literature on geographic
variations in health care, which has consistently documented large regional dispari-
ties in per-capita medical spending and the use of hundreds of medical interventions
(Phelps, 1992; Werlwi g and iCooper, 1999). Furthermore, this paper relates to how
agents learn about new production technologies (e.g. FOster aIl Roseizweig, 199 5;
(oiiley aml Udry1(li, 2010).
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides
detail on our empirical setting and data construction, and Section 3.3 describes the
extent of and variation in off-label usage across the new cancer drugs in our sample.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 set up and report the results from our main empirical specifica-
tions, while Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Setting and Data
3.2.1 Background on off-label drug use
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) holds regulatory authority in the U.S.
over the set of drugs which may be prescribed by physicians. Drugs that demonstrate
sufficient efficacy and safety in clinical trials receive FDA approval for specific uses or
indications which are defined in a drug's official labeling. Off-label use, which refers to
the administration of a drug in any manner that has not been approved by the FDA,
is legally permitted in the U.S. Examples of off-label use include the application of a
drug for milder forms of an approved indication, treatment for diseases with similar
symptoms or biological pathways to approved indications, expansions to unapproved
subpopulations such as pediatric patients, modifications of dosing, and unapproved
combination therapies.
Off-label drug use is common in a variety of medical practice settings, including
many where evidence on efficacy is thin or non-existent. For example, a nationally
representative evaluation of 160 commonly prescribed non-cancer drugs found that
21% were prescribed for off-label uses, of which nearly 75% had little or no scien-
tific support (Radley. Firkelstein, an1(d StaffordI, 2006). However, very little work has
studied the extent of off-label prescribing in cancer care outside narrowly defined
populations or practice settings (see Lev&qiie, 2008, for a review). In Section 3.3, we
seek to help fill this gap by measuring the extent of off-label use of 20 new cancer
drugs within a national sample of seniors, namely the 65+ Medicare population.
3.2.2 Data construction
The core data elements for our empirical analyses are regional utilization of new cancer
drugs, patient diagnoses for classifying drug use as on- or off-label, and FDA approval
information for each drug. To better understand regional heterogeneity in off-label
usage, we also collect information on regional characteristics including the location of
National Cancer Institute (NCI) designated cancer centers, regional concentrations
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in the supply of oncologists, overall regional utilization of medical resources, and the
location of pioneer investigators who ran the pivotal clinical trials for each drug.
Measuring cancer drug utilization
We analyze on- and off-label utilization of new cancer drugs within the Medicare
patient population during the 11-year period 1998-2008. During this period, 20 new
cancer drugs covered by traditional Medicare were approved by the FDA (see Table
-1.). Utilization of these drugs forms the basis of our analysis.
We measure drug utilization using a 100% sample of Medicare outpatient claims
and a 20% sample of Medicare physician carrier claims during 1998-2008. The pri-
mary unit of observation for our analysis is a patient-episode, defined to include all
chemotherapy and other cancer drug claims for a patient within a given provider re-
gion and calendar year. We specify provider regions using Hospital Referral Regions,
defined by the Dartmouth Atlas for Health Care to partition U.S. zip codes into
306 distinct regions. These regions, which are based on empirical measures of where
the majority of patients in each zip code seek tertiary care, are commonly used as
the regional unit of analysis in cancer care (Fisher et al., 2003a,b; (nega et al., 2008).
Under these definitions, our data comprise 3.7 million unique cancer patient-episodes.
In order to specify drug use as on- or off-label, we measure any diagnosed cancer
associated with each patient-episode. We restrict attention to the roughly 3 mil-
lion patient-episodes (80%) associated with at least one cancer diagnosis.' Of these
episodes, we further limit our final analysis sample to the 2.3 million episodes (76%)
associated with a single type of cancer. Under this restriction, we are able to more
precisely specify which type of cancer a given treatment is targeting for a particu-
lar patient. However, a limitation induced by the restriction is that we miss how
physicians treat patients with multiple primary cancers of different organs or systems
where clinical evidence may be more limited. This fits with the interpretation of our
results (as discussed further below) that our approach likely estimates a lower bound
'Some chemotherapy drugs are also used to treat non-cancer diseases including lupus, rheumatoid
arthritis, and vasculitis.
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on the full extent of off-label drug usage.
Specifying on- and off-label drug use
We next seek to measure the extent and manner of new cancer drug use within our
set of cancer patient episodes defined above. We use FDA approval histories for each
drug in our sample to specify the cancer for which the drug was initial approved.
Each patient episode-drug pair is then categorized as either on- or off-label based on
whether the cancer treated during that episode matches the drug's initial approval
(independent of whether the drug was actually received). It is worth noting that we
do not vary our on-label cancer categories over time, even if a drug is subsequently
approved for use with a new cancer type. However, only two drugs of the twenty in
our sample add a new cancer type to the labeled indications within two years following
initial approval, and both of these approvals occur in the second year. Column 10 of
Table 3-1 lists the year of FDA approval (if ever) for each drug's second-most common
off-label cancer use.
There are at least three reasons why our approach is likely to provide a lower
bound on the full degree of off-label drug usage. First, FDA approvals are often
very specific and narrow in scope regarding the circumstances under which a drug
is actually approved; the labeled indications reflect the particular types of patients
selected for the drug's pivotal clinical trial. For example, the drug cetuximab (Er-
bitux) was approved in 2004 for the treatment of metastatic colon cancer expressing
the growth factor gene EGFR in patients resistant to or intolerant of irinotecan-based
chemotherapy. Because ICD-9 diagnosis codes do not provide sufficient granularity
to determine the precise staging or subtype of cancers as well as many patient char-
acteristics including treatment history, categorization based on these codes will tend
to over-include patients in the on-label group. For example, all colon cancer patients
are marked as "on-label" for cetuximab in our sample.
A second reason we may underestimate the full extent of off-label usage is that
some off-label uses may not be covered by Medicare. To the extent that patients pay
for these treatments out of pocket, we will not observe this use. However, we suspect
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this to play a minor role in our measurement, both because Medicare covers a wide
variety of off-label usage, and because out-of-pocket payments for most new cancer
drugs are extremely high, often topping thousands of dollars per month of treatment
(Bach, 2009). Finally, a third reason we may underestimate off-label use is due to
the fact that we are limiting our analysis to patients with single cancers, as described
above. The effect this has on drug usage off-label relative to on-label is ambiguous,
however, since if drug use increases with illness intensity, it is likely to do so both on-
and off-label.
Regional characteristics
As a final step, we collect information on region-level (HRR) factors that may be
associated with regional variation in off-label prescribing to help shed light on drivers
of off-label use. We focus on three factors: regional presence of an NCI Comprehensive
Cancer Center, the supply of oncologists in the region, medical resource intensity as
measured by overall Medicare expenditures in each region, and regional proximity to
physician investigators who participated in early clinical trials.
We begin by marking HRRs that contain an NCI-designated Comprehensive Can-
cer Center (CCC). This designation is widely considered to be a prestigious mark
of excellence and is based on demonstrated quality in both laboratory and clinical
research. In 2012, there were 41 CCCs, spanning 36 distinct HRRs. To help gain a
sense of the prominence of these centers in clinical trial research, we note that 15 of
the 17 U.S.-based principal investigators (PIs) for the initial pivotal clinical trials of
the drugs in our sample were located in HRRs containing a CCC.
Next, we seek to obtain resource intensity measures of both capacity and medical
utilization for each HRR. For capacity, we use the number of oncologists per 100,000
residents in each HRR, based on 2006 counts of actively practicing physicians from
the American Medical Association. We measure medical utilization using the average
Medicare expenditure per beneficiary (adjusted for price, age, race, and sex) over
2003-2008, the period of our analysis for which this utilization measure is available
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(Gottlet., 201.
Finally, our data on the location of pioneer investigators comes from our previous
work on the diffusion of new cancer drugs, where the variables and their construction
are described in more detail (Agba annMl itor, 2012). We use FDA approval histo-
ries of new cancer drugs to identify the pivotal clinical trial on which FDA approval
was based. By matching each trial to its academic publication, we identify the PI
and all other authors on the study, including their geographic location (zipcode) at
the time of publication. This allows us to categorize each HRR based on whether it
contains the PI or any other author for a given drug's pivotal trial.
3.3 Describing Off-Label Prescribing of New Can-
cer Drugs
In this section, we present evidence on the extent of off-label prescribing of 20 new
cancer drugs introduced during the period 1998-2003. While previous studies have
documented off-label drug usage within oncology, these studies have largely been case
studies focusing on narrow sets of patients (especially populations historically under-
represented in clinical drug studies such as pregnant women and pediatric patients)
or practice settings (e.g. a particular clinic), making it difficult to draw general con-
clusions about the extent of off-label cancer drug prescribing. Our approach attempts
to resolve these shortcomings by analyzing a broad set of drugs initially approved for
a wide variety of different cancers, and measures usage in a large, national sample of
seniors aged 65 and older enrolled in traditional Medicare.
3.3.1 Off-label usage of new cancer drugs
Our main results on the degree of off-label drug use are summarized in Table 3-1. For
each drug, column 3 lists the type of cancer for which the drug was first approved
and spans a wide variety of cancers including breast, lung, colon, and hematologic
2We use regional physician counts and medical spending as compiled by the Dartmouth Atlas
and available for download at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx.
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cancers. Column 5 shows what fraction of prescriptions fell within this initial approval
disease category during the first two calendar years following initial FDA approval.
On average across these drugs, 78% of drug use was prescribed on-label (or near-
label), corresponding to more than 20% of drug use falling clearly off-label. Columns
7-10 describe off-label use within the disease comprising the largest share of off-label
use for each drug; on average, 44% of off-label use occurs within this disease.
Table 3-1 documents significant heterogeneity in off-label use across the drugs
in our sample. At the low end, only 4% of patients treated with ibritumomab, ful-
vestrant, and panitumumab (initially indicated for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, breast
cancer, and colon cancer, respectively) are off-label. On the high end, 70% of patients
prescribed capecitabine (breast cancer) and 90% of those treated with arsenic trioxide
(acute myeloid leukemia) are off-label.
To see how these rates correspond to clinical evidence on off-label efficacy, we an-
alyze two nationally recognized compendia used for determining medically-accepted
indications for drugs as well as Medicare coverage determinations: the United States
Pharmacopeia's USP DI, and American Hospital Formulary Service's AHFS DI. As of
2008, all three of ibritumomab, fulvestrant, and panitumumab were indicated only for
their FDA-approved indications. In contrast, the compendia indicated capecitabine
additionally for colon and stomach cancer, and indicated arsenic trioxide for acute
promyelocytic leukemia and myelodysplastic syndromes.3 This pattern supports the
plausible view that directions of early drug exploration are not independent of infor-
mation and expectations regarding efficacy.
3.3.2 The evolution of off-label use of new drugs
We now turn to describe how off-label use changes over time. Figure 3-1 summarizes
the prescribing patterns of the new cancer drugs in our sample, and we begin by
focusing on how these patterns evolve over event time (measured for each drug as the
3Multiple myeloma, the disease comprising the largest share of off-label use of arsenic trioxide
in the first two years following FDA approval as shown in Table 3--1, was a category for which the
drug was given FDA orphan drug status (not approval) in 2000. Beyond this orphan designation,
however, arsenic trioxide never shows up as indicated for multiple myeloma in these compendia.
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number of years since FDA approval). As shown in Panel A of Figure 3-1, on-label
use, measured as the fraction of appropriate patients receiving new cancer drugs, is
expanding over time. This rate of growth slows from roughly 2 percentage points
(-40% growth) between years 1-2 to roughly 1 percentage point (=13% growth)
between years 3-4. A similar pattern of growth is present when drug use is calculated
over the set of off-label patients, as shown in Panel B.
By itself, it is unclear whether this off-label growth is due to expansions of the
technology to broader populations of patients (intensive-margin adoption) or simply
due to increased take-up of the drug by new physicians (extensive-margin adoption).
By using on-label diffusion as a measure of extensive-margin adoption, we can shed
light on this issue by measuring the degree of off-label prescribing relative to on-label
prescribing. This calculation is presented in Panel C of Figure 3-1. During the first
year after a drug's FDA approval, roughly 17% of drug prescriptions were for off-label
cancers. By year 2, this fraction jumped to 22%, and continued climbing more slowly
to reach 28% by year 4. We interpret this as evidence that, on average, new cancer
drugs are in fact expanded to broader populations of patients over time.
3.3.3 NCI cancer centers and off-label exploration
Next, we explore how both levels and the time-path of exploration vary in regions
near one of 41 NCI-designated Comprehensive Cancer Centers. This designation
is awarded to medical institutions which excel in and promote collaborative cancer
research between the laboratory, clinical, and population sciences. As such, they are
especially well-positioned to manage clinical trials and may hold an advantage in
identifying and testing potentially beneficial off-label drug uses.
Just over 31% of the patient episodes in our sample are treated in one of the
36 HRRs containing a CCC. As shown in Panel B of Figure 3-1, patients treated
in HRR's containing a CCC are near 25% more likely to receive new drugs (within
4 The expansion of on-label use may also partly be intensive marge, as physicians may expand
the treatment to new subpopulations or near-label populations within the approved cancer type. To
the extent this is happening, the interpretation is that the intensive margin of off-label expansion is
faster than within the on-label category.
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2 years of FDA approval) off-label compared with non-CCC regions. This pattern
suggests that CCC regions engage in a greater degree of exploration with new drugs.
One alternative explanation of this effect, however, is that new drugs may diffuse
more quickly to physicians in CCC regions. Another explanation is that patients in
CCC regions are different (perhaps sicker) and are more appropriate for new drug
treatments. Both these alternate stories suggest the testable implication that drug
use would be higher not only in off-label patients, but also on-label. However, Panel
A of Figure 3-1 shows that extent of on-label use is highly similar across both types
of regions, and if anything is slightly lower in CCC regions. Correspondingly, Panel
C shows that the fraction of new drugs prescribed off-label is also higher by 4.2
percentage points (over the first 2 years) in CCC regions.
While off-label prescribing is higher in CCC regions compared with non-CCC re-
gions, the gap is modest and appears to close over time in both relative and absolute
terms. Focusing on the fraction of off-label prescribing, CCC regions are 4.2 per-
centage points (21%) more exploratory than non-CCC regions in the first two years
following a drug's approval. This gap closes to 2.8 percentage points (11%) over years
three and four following FDA approval.
This result is descriptively similar to previous research finding that cancer cen-
ter designation explains little of the overall variation in end-of-life cancer treatment
intensity (e.g. Mcren el Al., 2012). Furthermore, to the extent this finding corre-
sponds to high-quality treatment availability both within and outside CCC regions,
it alleviates concerns that patients may encounter barriers to treatment based on the
geographic proximity of NCI-designated cancer centers (Onega et al, 2008). Finally,
while the unbalanced nature of our sample limits our ability to explore the extent
to which off-label usage continues to converge after four years of approval, we note
that the convergence here is qualitatively similar to our finding in Aglia and Molitor
(2012) that regions which prescribe newly approved drugs more intensively (on-label)
converge to the national average over time.
The observed pattern of convergence in off-label prescribing between CCC and
non-CCC regions over a drug's first few years is consistent with the hypothesis that
106
exploration uncovers information which subsequently diffuses across regions over time.
To the extent that early exploration creates a public good, an important question
is whether the degree of exploration with new cancer drugs is suboptimal, as some
physicians may choose to free ride on the exploration of others. However, it is possible
that not all exploration produces a similar quality of public information, which could
happen for example if some regions tend to explore new drug uses in a clinical trial
context while other regions prescribe off-label in an uncontrolled setting. If so, the
overall level of exploration may or may not be optimal, but the concentration of early
exploration in settings best equipped for producing high quality information would
likely be too low. We see these issues as important avenues for future research.
3.3.4 Oncologist supply and off-label exploration
We now turn to explore how regional variation in off-label prescribing varies with one
measure of regional medical capacity, namely the supply of oncologists. A significant
amount of interest in the health economics literature has focused on how medical
utilization responds to local capacity such as the supply of hospital beds and medical
specialists. Positive associations between capacity and utilization have been observed
in a variety of contexts (e.g. Fisher et al., 200'3, The Dartmouth Atlas of Health
Care). The evidence on the causal link is mixed, however, largely because of challenges
in disentangling supply effects from demand (Dranove and(1 W ehner, 1991).
To tie our setting into this literature, we describe how drug use varies with the
concentration of oncologist supply, measured as the number of practicing oncologists
per 100,000 population in each HRR in 2006. We are particularly interested in the
possibility that a greater supply of physicians in a region could lead to increased
off-label use, for example because patients may have access to a broader array of
recommended treated options. Of course, establishing a causal connection between
supply and utilization is a challenge here as in the demand-inducement literature.
One advantage of our context is that we can use on-label prescribing as a benchmark
for the degree with which new drugs are utilized in a given region.
Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between regional prescribing patterns and the
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supply of oncologists. As highlighted in Panel A, there is no systematic relation-
ship between physician supply and on-label use of a new drug within the first two
years following FDA approval. This suggests that the supply of cancer specialists is
not associated with factors related to patient clinical appropriateness for new cancer
treatments. However, Panel B shows that oncologist supply is strongly and posi-
tively associated with increases fraction of patients who receive off-label treatments.
Combining these two patterns, Panel C shows that the fraction of off-label use is
significantly higher in regions with greater oncologist supply: a 1 standard deviation
increase in the supply of oncologists corresponds to a 0.26 standard deviation increase
in the fraction of prescribing falling off-label.
3.3.5 Medicare expenditure intensity and off-label exploration
An extensive literature has documented dramatic variation in health spending per
capita across U.S. regions, much of which has been linked to regional differences in
practice patterns such as diagnostic testing and specialist visits. Because these spend-
ing disparties are not correlated with regional treatment quality or health outcomes,
they have received extensive attention in both academic and policy circles and have
been proposed as offering a key to Medicare reform (CongressionlI Budget Office,
2008; Skinner aind \Vennberg, 2000). Because of this broad interest in the differ-
ences between low- and high-spending regions, we briefly explore how the intensity
of off-label use varies with overall medical resource utilization in each region. For
our analysis, we use the (Iotlibch e a. (2010) construction of per capita Medicare
spending adjusted for regional price and age-race-sex composition as our measure of
per capita resource utilization within each HRR.
Figure 3-3 shows how new drug use varies across regions by per capita utilization
averaged across the period 2003-2008, the years of our sample for which utilization
data are available. Interestingly, neither on- nor off-label usage patterns show an
association with overall medical utilization. Factors which drive overall variation in
expenditures such as more intensive end-of-life care are not systematically correlated
with factors driving the intensity of chemotherapy cancer care. Importantly, this
108
further suggests that proposals to increase efficiency in Medicare by encouraging
(overall) high-spending regions to mirror the practice patterns of low-spending regions
such as made by Vennberg, Fisher. alnd Skinner (2002) are unlikely to be have a large
impact on costly cancer care.
3.4 Clinical Trial Expertise and Off-Label Drug
Use
In this section, we test whether regions that contain the principal investigator (PI) of
the drug's pivotal clinical trial are more likely to use the drug on off-label patients. In
previous work, we have demonstrated that patients with the on-label disease who are
treated in the PI's HRR have a greater propensity to be treated with a new cancer
drug. If this increased use is driven by greater enthusiasm for the drug's efficacy or
greater knowledge of appropriate management for patients undergoing therapy with
the new drug, then we may expect this to spill over and increase use of the drug
off-label. On the other hand, if learning about a drug's management and value is
highly local to the set of patients analyzed in the clinical trial, then off-label use may
not differ markedly across PI and other HRRs.
3.4.1 Empirical specification
We test whether PI HRRs are more more likely to use the drug on an off-label patient
by estimating the following regression:
(drug)ijtd {HRR x disease-group x label-status FEs}ijd + {drug x disease x year FEs}jdt
+ Of1(PI HRR)jd + -y5 f1(PI HRR)jdl (on-label patient)id - eijtd (3.1)
An observation is a patient-drug episode (patient i treated in provider region
j, t years after drug d was approved). The regression is estimated over patient-drug
episodes that fall within two years following FDA approval of the drug. As previously
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discussed in section 3.2.2, we restrict the sample to the 76% of cancer chemotherapy
patients who received only one type of cancer diagnosis over the observed calendar
year. This approach allows us to consistently categorize patients into mutually ex-
clusive categories depending on whether their particular diagnosis is covered by the
initial FDA label.
The first term in the regression above is a vector of fixed effects measuring each
HRR's propensity to use new chemotherapy drugs that are on- or off-label for each of
three cancer disease types. Targeted diseases are grouped based on the cancer sub-
type: hematologic cancers (leukemias and lymphomas), urologic cancers (kidney and
bladder cancer), and other carcinomas (brain, breast, colon, and lung cancer). This
allows regions to differ in their enthusiasm and patient suitability for new chemother-
apies treatments of each disease group. The second term in the regression allows each
drug to face an idiosyncratic yearly shock to its popularity for treating each of 59
coded cancer diagnoses.
Next, we include an indicator, 1(PJ HRR)d, for whether the first author (the
PI) of drug d's pivotal clinical trial is located in region j. The coefficient of on
this indicator describes how much more likely a cancer patient without the on-label
diagnosis is to receive a new drug if treated in the HRR where the PI of the drug's
pivotal clinical trial is located. Lastly, the regression includes an interaction term
between whether the patient is treated in the PI HRR and whether the observed
patient has an on-label diagnosis. The coefficient -yf on this indicator tests whether
on-label patients have a greater propensity than off-label patients to receive the new
drug when treated in the PI HRR, after controlling for differences in drug use across
on- and off-label diseases in other regions.
3.4.2 Results
Regression results from specification (3. 1) are reported in Table 3-2, Panels A through
D. Panel A, column (1) reports that seeking care in the PI HRR does not increase
5ICD-9 diagnosis codes are grouped into 59 cancer types to mirror the taxonomy used by the
National Cancer Institute in the reporting of cancer incidence statistics.
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the likelihood that a patient with an off-label diagnosis is treated with the new drug.
The point estimate suggests that 1 fewer patient per 10,000 off-label cancer patients
undergoing chemotherapy will receive the new drug in the PI HRR. However, the
95% confidence interval ranges from a 9 patient decrease to a 7 patient increase per
10,000 patients, from a mean treatment level of 11 per 10,000 off-label patients. By
contrast, on-label patients are 3.3 percentage points more likely to receive the drug,
from a mean of 6.6% of on-label patients receiving the drug.
Panel A, column (2) presents analogous results where the indicator for PI HRR
is replaced with an indicator for treatment in an HRR containing any author of the
drug's initial pivotal trail. The results are qualitatively similiar to those described
above. For patients with off-label diagnoses, the impact of being treated in an author
HRR is bounded between a 4 patient per 10,000 increase or decrease in patients
being treated with the new drug. On label patients treated in author HRRs are 1.3
percentage points more likely to receive the new drug.
The same pattern arises once the sample is limited to patients treated in an HRR
containing the PI (column 3) or any author (column 4) for at least one of the in-
sample cancer drugs. This suggests that the results are not driven by differences in
drug use attributable, for example, to greater enthusiasm for new drugs in the PI
regions.
Since the mean utilization of a cancer drug on the entire population of chemotherapy-
treated patients with an off-label diagnosis is very low at 0.11%, it may be difficult to
precisely estimate any small change in this probability associated with author status.
To mitigate this problem, in Table 1, Panel C, the sample is restricted to patients
who have either the on-label diagnosis or the most common off-label diagnosis for
which the drug prescribed. In this population, the rates of new drug use amongst the
off-label patients, while still low at 0.57 percent, are over five times as high as in the
full population of off-label patients. Again, we do not find any significant differences
in off-label utilization across PI HRRs and other regions.
Lastly, Table 3-2 Panel D presents results for the subset of five drugs for which
the FDA eventually extended the indicated population to new cancer types not in-
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cluded on the initial label. These are drugs for which use beyond the initial label
indications may be particularly appropriate. Even within this sample of drugs, we
find no differences in the initial prescription patterns of PI regions.
Another way of framing the question about which regions are more experimental
in their use of a new drug is to ask what proportion of the new drug's use in a region
is on patients with diseases not indicated on the initial label. This outcome inherently
conditions on the overall intensity of new drug use in a region, and then tests how
much of this use is clearly beyond the scope of the initial drug label. This will more
directly test whether PI HRRs are using the drugs on the same set of patients as
non-PI HRRs.
Analysis of this outcome variable is reported in Table 3-2, Panels E and F. The
regression specification is as follows:
(off-label use
tofalu use) = {HRR x disease-group FEs}jd +{drug x year FEs}jdttotal drug use) t
+ Of51(PI H RR)jd -+ Ejta (3.2)
An observation is region j's use of drug d, t years after the drug's approval. Analogous
to the previous specifications, we control for each HRR's tendency to use a drug off-
label within each of the three cancer disease groups described above. In addition, we
control for drug-by-year shocks in the applications of the drug. The key coefficient of
interest is #f which indicates how much more likely off-label use is relative to total
drug use in the PI HRR.
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 3-2 Panels E & F. Again we find
no evidence of greater experimental use by PI HRRs. In column (1), it is reported
that 2.9 percent fewer new drug applications are on off-label patients in the PI HRR
compared to other regions, but the estimate is imprecise, with a standard error of
3.1 percentage points. Estimates are similarly small, negative, and not statistically
significant when reported for regions containing any study author (column 2), or
restricted to the sample of regions that ever contain a PI (column 3) or other author
112
(column 4) for any drug. The findings from the previous section naturally predict
these results: increased use of the drug for on-label patients in the PI HRR along
with unchanged use for off-label patients should lead to a smaller fraction of the new
drug's use on off-label patients in the PI HRR.
Taken together, these findings suggest that despite the higher levels of utilization
of new cancer drugs on the indicated patients in the PI HRR, these regions are
not necessarily more aggressive in their use of the drug on off-label patients. If the
learning about a drug's efficacy that takes place through participation in a clinical
trial is quite local to the patient population under study, then this finding would
be expected. Physicians in the PI HRR may be particularly well informed about the
positive impact of the drug for the on-label population, but may have little advantage
in estimating the drug's impact on patients with unrelated diagnoses.
3.5 The Impact of FDA Label Changes on Drug
Use
In this section, we investigate the impact of expansions to the indicated conditions
on the FDA label. We analyze two types of label expansions: indications within
the same broad cancer type indicated on the original label, and indications for new
types of cancer. We begin by describing two possible mechanisms for FDA labeling
to impact drug utilization.
First, FDA approvals may boost drug use by providing a signal of the drug's qual-
ity for the indicated patient population. Since physicians have considerable latitude
to experiment with off-label applications for new drugs, it is conceivable that over
time doctors could fully recover the function mapping drug treatment choice to pa-
tient outcomes, even in the absence of new clinical trials and approvals. However, if
physicians are not perfectly informed about the drug's value, an FDA approval may
provide a public signal that high-quality research supports the use of the new drug
for the on-label patients, thereby reducing uncertainty about the value of the drug
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for the indicated patient group.
Second, FDA approval may improve physicians' confidence that the drug will be
covered by Medicare for the indicated condition and thus increase utilization. We
suspect this does not play a large role in our context given that Medicare covers a
wide variety of off-label drug applications. In addition, for indication expansions that
are within the same broad cancer category as the original FDA label, diagnosis codes
used for billing purposes rarely distinguish the newly indicated patients from those
previously covered. Thus, it would be unlikely that Medicare would reject claims
for the newly-covered patients even in the absence of FDA approval, since without
detailed and costly auditing of patient charts, Medicare could not easily distinguish
the different types of patients.
3.5.1 Expansions within the original indicated cancer type
For five of the twenty drugs in our sample, the FDA expanded the indicated uses
within the broad cancer category covered by the original label, within five years of the
drug's initial FDA approval: capecitabine, oxaliplatin, bortezomib, pemetrexed, and
bevacizuiab. For example, bortezomib was first approved only for patients with mul-
tiple myeloma who have received at least two prior therapies and have demonstrated
disease progression since the last therapy. Two years later, the FDA expanded these
indications to cover patients who have failed only one prior therapy, thus broadening
the population of multiple myeloma patients eligible for treatment. The blockbuster
drug bevacizumab had a similar path, where it was first approved in combination with
5-fluorouracil based chemotherapy as a first-line treatment for metastatic colorectal
cancer, and was expanded two years later to include use as a second-line treatment.
We test the impact of these label expansions by estimating the following regres-
sions:
(drug)itd = {year FEs}t + {drug FEs}d
+ #f 1(post indication expansion)dt + Eitd (3.3)
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An observation is a patient-drug episode (patient i treated t years after drug d was
approved), and the regression is estimated over patient-drug episodes that fall within
five years following FDA approval of the drug. Only patients with a cancer disease
indicated on the original label are included in the estimation sample.
The regression controls for drug and time fixed effects and then estimates the
change in the propensity to use the new drug after the FDA expands the labeled
indications. Note that the identifying assumptions required to interpret this regression
are somewhat stronger than those required for the preceding regression analysis. Since
there are no regional differences in the experience of an FDA expansion, the setting
precludes the inclusion of drug-specific year fixed effects. Because the use of drugs
that eventually have expanded indications may be growing at a faster rate than the
use of other drugs even in the absence of changes to the FDA label, we also estimate
the above equation with the inclusion of drug-specific linear time trends.
Results from these regressions are reported in Table 3-3, Panel A. Indication
expansions are associated with consistently large, statistically significant increases
in drug utilization across all specifications. In column 1, we report results from
estimating equation (3.3) including all 20 drugs under study. We find that patients
are 12.7 percentage points more likely to be treated with the new drug after an
FDA approval expansion. Allowing for drug-specific linear time trends, the effect size
attenuates somewhat, but the FDA label change is still associated with 9.4 percentage
points higher probability of receiving the drug, significant at the 1% level. Mean
utilization of these five drugs in the year before their FDA label change was 9.6%,
so these estimates suggest that use almost doubles as a result of the expansion of
on-label indications.
In columns 3 and 4, we repeat the regression analysis, restricting the sample to
patients with the on-label cancer type for the five drugs that eventually expand their
indications. If the use of these five drugs is growing more rapidly than other drugs even
in the absence of FDA label changes and this differential growth is nonlinear, then it
is possible that the previous specifications will overstate the impact of FDA labeling
changes. The drawback of this sample restriction is that we may underestimate the
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impact of the FDA labeling change, particularly if the gains are not all realized
immediately.
Results estimated over this restricted sample continue to find an increase in drug
use after FDA labeling changes of about 4 percentage points; while this still consti-
tutes a large change in drug utilization, the estimated effect is substantially smaller
than that estimated over the unrestricted regression sample. The effects remain sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level.
3.5.2 Expansions to new cancer types
The above section analyzed label changes that fell within the broad cancer category
(e.g. breast cancer, colorectal cancer) covered by the initial label. In this section, we
turn to FDA label changes that expand the indications to an entirely new category of
cancer. There are three drugs in our sample that experience such a change within the
first five years after drug introduction. One of these drugs, bevacizumab, is expanded
to three new cancer categories. The other two drugs, bortezomib and capecitabine,
each expand to one new category.
We investigate these labeling changes using the same regression framework de-
scribed in the previous section. However, the sample is now restricted only to off-
label uses of the drug. For drugs that do not experience a label expansion, the sample
includes the most common off-label diagnosis to which the drug is applied. For drugs
that do experience this type of label expansion, we also include each disease group
that is eventually covered by the label.
Again, we estimate that new FDA approval is associated with large changes in
drug utilization. As reported in Table 3-3, Panel B, point estimates are broadly
consistent across specifications, regardless of inclusion of drug-specific time trends
6Note that this setting would seem particularly well suited to an event-study graph where we plot
differences in drug utilization for expanded drugs (as compared to other drugs) for each year before
and after the labeling change. However, due to the short time window of our analysis (up to 5 years
post drug introduction), and the fact that many drugs experience their label expansion less than
two years after the introduction of the new drug code that allows us to observe drug utilization, the
sample does not allow the assessment of pre-trends over a balanced panel even for two years prior
to new drug introduction.
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(columns 2 and 4) or restriction of the sample only to the three drugs that experience
label expansions (columns 3 and 4). The estimated increase in drug use ranges across
specifications from 2.4 to 3.0 percentage points, each significant at the 1% level. In
the year preceding the label change, 1.1% of patients with the cancer diagnoses that
were about to be added to the label received treatment with the new drug. Thus
drug utilization was two to three times higher after the drug indication was formally
added to the label-an even greater effect size than that estimated for expansions
within the initial disease category.
Taken together, these results suggest that physician prescribing patterns respond
substantially to FDA labeling changes. It suggests that despite physician's extensive
ability to experiment with off-label uses of a new drug prior to a label expansion, there
is significant new information revealed by changes to the FDA label and associated
clinical research.
3.5.3 Do PI regions better anticipate drug expansions?
In this section we return to the question of whether PI regions have more information
about a drug's value and applications than non-PI regions, and how this influences
drug utilization. We compare drugs that have FDA label expansions within the initial
indicated cancer category to drugs that are not re-labeled and test whether PI regions
better anticipate the drug's broader value.
(drugj=td {HRR x disease-group x label-status FEs}ijd + { drug x disease x year FEs}dt
+ Of1(PI HRR)d + 7f1(PI HRR)jdl (expanded indication)d + Eijtd
(3.4)
Analogous to equation (,3. 1, an observation is a patient-drug episode (patient
i treated in provider region j, t years after drug d was approved). The sample is
restricted to patients with the broad cancer category indicated on the initial label.
The coefficient of interest -yf multiplies a variable that equals one if the patient is
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treated in the PI HRR for a given drug and if the drug is one of the five to eventually
have its indications expanded within the initial disease category. The coefficient will
allow us to compare whether PI HRRs use these five drugs at even greater rates than
other regions, compared to the difference in utilization across PI and other regions
for the 15 drugs that do not experience this type of label expansion.
Results reported in Table 3-3, Panel C, find that author HRRs do have even higher
rates of new drug utilization for those drugs that eventually expand their indications,
but these differences are imprecisely estimated and so not statistically significant.
Column (1) finds that PI HRRs have 2.5 percentage point higher rates of drug use
for non-expanded drugs, significant at the 5% level. This difference is 1.1 percentage
points greater for eventually expanded drugs. Results are qualitatively similar when
the sample is restricted to the first two years after initial FDA approval, as reported
in columns 3 and 4.
The findings suggest that PI HRRs may be correctly informed about the greater
value of these drugs that will eventually receive formal approval for a broader set of
indications, but unfortunately, we lack statistical power to precisely estimate these
differences.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a novel description of off-label utilization of 20 new cancer
drugs. Using a conservative measure of off-label use, we estimate that over 20% of
a new cancer drug's applications are clearly beyond the purview of the initial FDA
label. Further, we find that regions with special expertise in cancer care and cancer
research, as measured by the National Cancer Institute Cancer Center classification
or by the per capita concentration of oncologists, are more experimental in their
utilization of new cancer drugs. These high cancer expertise regions have a greater
propensity to use new drugs on off-label patients, but their utilization is no different
from other regions for on-label patients.
We further investigate whether regions that contain the principal investigator
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from the drug's pivotal clinical trial are more experimental in their applications of
that new drug. Despite the fact that PI HRRs are more likely to use the drug for
on-label patients, there are no significant differences in their utilization for off-label
patients. Thus, differences in early information about a drug's on-label applications
do not appear to be large drivers of off-label drug utilization.
Lastly, we investigate the impact of expansions to the FDA approved drug indica-
tions. These changes to the FDA label are associated with large, significant increases
in drug use, suggesting that physicians respond strongly to the labeling changes and
supporting research. This responsiveness to label changes suggests a strong role for
clinical trials or regulatory recommendations to influence physician prescribing be-
havior.
The evidence presented here supports the view that there is substantial clinical
uncertainty about the value of new medical technologies over the first several years
of diffusion. Large changes in total drug utilization and the mix of patients receiving
treatment occur over this period, as physicians learn about a drug's value and appro-
priate applications. Since the initial FDA label often does not cover the full set of
potentially valuable applications of a drug, many physicians, particularly those with
special expertise in cancer research and care, experiment informally with new drugs,
prescribing them to patients for whom there is little documented, scientific evidence
of benefit. Despite this widespread informal experimentation, physicians still appear
to be very responsive to the clinical trial information and expert judgement signalled
by label expansions.
The productivity returns to technology adoption not only depend on the binary
decision a physician might make to start using a new technology, but also critically
depend on how intensively to use the technology and in which situations. These
findings suggest that there may be significant welfare gains associated with lowering
the cost of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about the clinical
value of new medical technologies.
119
Figure 3-1: NCI Comprehensive Cancer Center Proximity and Drug Use
A: Fraction on-label patients receiving new drugs
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Notes: Patient observations are episode-drug pairs. Observations are categorized as on-label if the
drug was initially indicated for the cancer associated with the patient episode.
120
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.4A
0.3
0.2
0'
0.0
Figure 3-2: New Drug Use by Oncologist Concentration
A: On-label new drug utilization vs. oncologist capacity
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Notes: Each HRR contributes an observation. Drug prescribing patterns are calculated based on
patient-drug episodes, which are categorized as on-label if the drug was initially indicated for the
cancer associated with the patient episode. Trendlines calculated based on HRR-level regressions
weighted by the.number of relevant patient-drug episodes in the HRR. Standard errors clustered at
the HRR-level are used to calculate the slope p-values.
121
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001
0 -
0
I
0 " ---
0 8
0.005 ,
8
Figure 3-3: New Drug Use by Medicare Expenditures
A: On-label new drug utilization vs. Medicare spending
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Table 3-1: List of studied cancer drugs
Initial indication Most common off-label use
Trade Fraction patients Fraction drug use FDA Fraction patients Fraction drug use FDA
Generic drug name nameDisease receiving drug within disease approved receiving drug within disease approved
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Capecitabine Xeloda breast cancer 0.07% 30.38% 4/30/1998 colon cancer 0.09% 39.24% 4/30/2001
Trastuzumab' Herceptin breast cancer
Valrubicin Valstar bladder cancer
Denileukin diftitox Ontak cutaneous T-cell lymphoma
Temozolomide
Epirubicin hydrochloride
Gemtuzumab ozogamicin
Arsenic trioxide
Alemtuzumab
Ibritumomab tiuxetan
Fulvestrant
Oxaliplatin
Bortezomib
Tositumomab-1 131
Pemetrexed
Cetuximab
Bevacizumabz
Decitabine
Panitumumab
Temsirolimus
Total
Temodar brain cancer
Mylotarg acute myeloid leukemia
Trisenox acute myeloid leukemia
Campath chronic lymphocytic leukemia
Zevalin non-Hodgkin's lymphoma
Faslodex breastcancer
Eloxatin colon cancer
Velcade multiple myeloma
Bexxar non-Hodgkin's lymphoma
Alimta lung cancer
Erbitux colon cancer
Avastin colon cancer
Dacogen myelodysplastic syndromes
Vectibix colon cancer
Torisel kidney cancer
2.24% 90.19% 9/25/1998
0.28% 93.75% 9/25/1998
8.06% 69.01% 2/5/1999
5.48% 86.30% 8/11/1999
0.36% 70.49% 9/15/1999
9.77% 73.08% 5/17/2000
1.17% 10.06% 9/25/2000
2.98% 60.59% 5/7/2001
1.25% 96.02% 2/19/2002
4.90% 95.85% 4/25/2002
12.65% 82.88% 8/9/2002
18.83% 87.92% 5/13/2003
0.77% 92.98% 6/27/2003
8.18% 90.33% 2/4/2004
7.88% 72.30% 2/12/2004
22.13% 64.70% 2/26/2004
16.02% 81.82% 5/2/2006
1.89% 96.24% 9/27/2006
17.12% 93.56% 5/30/2007
5.97% 78.26%
lung cancer
carcinoma in situ
breast cancer, Hodgkin's disease
melanoma, uncertain neoplasms
stomach cancer
lung cancer
multiple myeloma
lymphoma
prostate cancer
lung cancer
pancreas cancer
lymphoma
thyroid cancer
intrathoracic (non-lung) cancer
pharynx cancer
lung cancer
leukemia (AML/APL)
lung cancer
lung cancer
0.04% 2.30%
0.62% 14.06%
0.01% 5.63%
0.19% 4.11%
0.59% 7.65%
0.03% 6.59%
0.47% 33.96%
0.21% 21.18%
0.01% 1.70%
0.02% 0.69%
2.23% 2.93%
0.82% 9.64% 12/8/2006
5.62% 4.21%
44.97% 5.65%
14.43% 6.14% 3/1/2006
3.44% 16.77% 10/11/2006
9.23% 12.58%
0.01% 0.75%
0.02% 2.48%
0.56% 9.46%
Note: statistics calculated using prescribing patterns over the first two calendar years following initial FDA approval of each drug.
Subsequent approval for gastric or gastroesophageal (10/20/2010) cancer.
2Subsequent FDA approvals for breast (2/22/2008), brain (5/5/2009), and kidney (7/31/2009) cancers.
Ellence
CAD
breast cancer
Table 3-2: Author Proximity Effect on Drug Utilization
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: (drug)_id in {0,1}, indicates receipt of new cancer drug
Panels A-D d by patient i
A. All HRRs B. Author HRRs only
(author in HRR) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
(author in HRR)*(on label) 0.0325*** 0.0133*** 0.0262** 0.0127**
(0.0113) (0.0050) (0.0114) (0.0053)
author type PI any PI any
drug -disease-eventyr FEs X X X X
HRR-cancer-label FEs X X X X
N 7,210,488 7,210,488 916,482 3,083,262
C. On-label & 2nd most common D. Drugs with FDA Approval
diagnosis only Expansions
(author in HRR) -0.0031 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0008)
(author in HRR)*(on label) 0.0401*** 0.0144*** 0.0527*** 0.0222**
(0.0117) (0.0051) (0.0141) (0.0097)
author type PI any PI any
drug-disease-eventyr FEs X X X X
HRR-cancer-label FEs X X X X
N 1,010,754 1,010,754 1,671,283 1,671,283
Dependent variable: (fraction off-label)_jd indicates fraction of drug's use that
Panels E-F is off-label in region j for drug d
E. All HRRs F. Author HRRs only
(author in HRR) -0.029 -0.029* -0.007 -0.022
(0.031) (0.016) (0.042) (0.016)
author type PI any PI any
drug-disease-eventyr FEs X X X X
HRR-cancer-label FEs X X X X
N 35,507 35,507 4,991 16,013
All panels: Author HRRs based on location of authors of each drug's pivotal clinical trial on which initial FDA
approval was based. HRR-cancer fixed effects defined using three categories of cancer drugs: urologic,
hematologic, and other (including breast, colon, lung, and brain). Standard errors clustered at the HRR-drug
level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
Panels A, B, C, D: Each observation is a patient-drug episode (patient episodes may indicate multiple drugs).
(1-2) All HRRs and patient episodes within 1-2 calendar years after drug's FDA approval.
Panels B & F, column 3: Sample limited to HRRs which ever contain a Principal Investigator (PI).
Panels B & F, column 4: Sample limited to HRRs which ever contain any pivotal trial author.
Panels A & B: Includes all patients treated within included HRRs and 20 in-sample drugs.
Panel C: Only includes patients with: (a) disease type that was on original drug label, or (b) the most common
category of off-label use.
Panel D: Limited to the 5 drugs that eventually have new cancer types added to their label.
Panels E & F: Each observation is an HRR-drug-year. Reported N indicates number of patient-drug episodes.
124
Table 3-3: FDA Approval Expansions
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: (drug)_id in {0,1}, indicates receipt
of new cancer drug d by patient i.
A. Impact of expansion within original indicated disease
post indication expansion
drug FEs
event year FEs
drug-specific time trend
restricted sample?
N
category
0.127*** 0.094*** 0.043*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
No No Yes Yes
1,324,426 1,324,426 511,076 511,076
post addition of indication to label
drug FEs
event year FEs
drug-specific time trend
restricted sample?
N
(author in HRR)
(author in HRR)*(expanded indication)
author type
drug-disease-eventyr FEs
HRR-cancer FEs
event years included
B. Impact of expansions to new disease ca
0.027*** 0.028*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
tegories
0.030***
(0.001)
X
X
X
No No Yes Yes
1,537,232 1,537,232 398,914 398,914
C. Impact of proximity to original trial author, by
eventual indication expansion status
0.025**
(0.012)
0.011
(0.015)
PI
X
X
0.010**
(0.005)
0.004
(0.008)
any
X
X
1-5 1-5
0.029
(0.020)
0.017
(0.022)
PI
X
X
1-2
N 1,404,967 1,404,967 423,767
0.011
(0.009)
0.008
(0.011)
any
X
-X
1-2
423,767
Notes: Each observation is a patient-drug episode (patient episodes may indicate multiple drugs).
Standard errors clustered at the HRR-drug level shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05;
***: p<0.01.
Panels A & B: All HRRs and patient episodes within 1-5 calendar years after drug's FDA approval.
Columns (3) and (4) restrict to drugs that experience the type of label change under analysis.
Panel A: Sample limited to the cancer type included on original label, and analyzes the impact of
expansions within that cancer type.
Panel B: Sample limited to the most common off-label cancer type as well as any cancer types
NOT on original FDA label but eventually added to label. Analyzes impact of adding the cancer to
the label.
Panel C: Sample limited to cancer type included on original label. Analyzes whether author HRRs
are even more intensive in their use of new drugs that eventually receive label extensions.
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